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PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW: 
BRINGING LABOR BACK INTO THE STUDY OF LAW AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Catherine L. Fisk 
Diana S. Reddy* 
ABSTRACT 
Within the rich, interdisciplinary literature on law and social movements, 
scholarly attention has often focused on how the civil rights movement, and 
other movements that share a resemblance to it, have mobilized law; less 
attention has been paid to the labor movement’s experience of being regulated 
by law. In this Article, we ask how refocusing on the experiences of labor unions 
regulated by law complicates understandings of how movements shape law, and 
law shapes movements, in turn. 
To explore the relationship between labor and law at a critical historical 
juncture, we delve into the largely unexplored legal history of the first major 
damages judgment against a labor union under the Taft-Hartley amendments to 
the National Labor Relations Act. Decided as the New Deal era gave way to the 
“rights revolution” of the 1950s and 1960s, this case dramatizes the costs of the 
labor movement’s distinct regulatory framework. Law helped institutionalize 
unions—to give them autonomy, power, and legitimacy. At the same time, it 
subjected them to an increasingly restrictive regulatory scheme that made it 
harder for them to act—or to be seen—as a social movement. 
 
 * Fisk is the Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Reddy 
is a Doctoral researcher in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., New York 
University School of Law. Our title is drawn from labor and civil liberties activist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who 
said: “There is less violence against labor today, but there are more legal restrictions . . . . There has been labor 
protection by law but there has also been labor repression by law[.]” Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Memories of the 
Industrial Workers of the World (Nov. 8, 1962) (transcript available at http://www.sojust.net/speeches/ 
elizabeth_flynn_memories.html). 
We are grateful for comments from Kathryn Abrams, Catherine Albiston, Erwin Chemerinsky, Scott 
Cummings, Lauren Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman, Nelson Lichtenstein, Michael McCann, Doug NeJaime, 
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the Library of Congress, for his assistance with the Joseph Rauh Papers; Robin Walker, Librarian and Archivist 
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Refocusing on labor re-centers the role of law in constructing the 
jurisprudential boundaries which channeled social movement activity 
throughout the twentieth century. As social movements today challenge these 
boundaries in order to assert more intersectional grievances, interrogating 
taken-for-granted notions about law and movements could not be more 
important. 
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Don’t call it a comeback 
I’ve been here for years1 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 22, 2019, a New York Times headline proclaimed: Stunning 
$93.6 Million Verdict Threatens to Bankrupt Major Union.2 The article 
recounted an ordinary dispute between the Portland local chapter of the 
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the company that 
operated the city port; workers had protested the company’s failure to hire union 
members for two jobs.3 What was extraordinary about the dispute was that it 
resulted in a $93.6 million jury verdict against the union.4 The ILWU’s total 
assets in November 2019—every cent contributed by its working-class 
members—were only $8 million.5 Accordingly, the article noted that if the 
verdict were sustained, it could bankrupt the union, “embolden employers 
frustrated by labor disruptions,” and “chill[] the activities of unions that are just 
finding their footing after decades of setbacks.”6 In other words, the everyday 
application of law would destroy a social movement organization and, perhaps 
with it, quell a new wave of labor activism. 
The year 2019 was not the first time that the ILWU (or other labor unions) 
faced a potentially catastrophic verdict as a result of protest activity arising from 
an everyday dispute. As we detail below, in 1949, the ILWU was hit with a 
verdict worth about $8 million in 2020 dollars for picketing outside the Juneau 
Spruce lumber mill in Alaska.7 The United States Supreme Court upheld the 
 
 1 L.L. Cool J, Mama Said Knock You Out, on MAMA SAID KNOCK YOU OUT (Def Jams Recordings 
1990). 
 2 Mike Baker, Stunning $93.6 Million Verdict Threatens to Bankrupt Major Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 2019, at A18. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. After the initial jury verdict, the judge denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, ordered remittitur to $19 million, and, alternatively, a new trial on damages. ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l 
Longshore & Warehouse Union, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1338–39 (D. Or. 2020); Maxine Bernstein, Oregon 
Jury’s $93.6 Million in Damages Verdict Against Longshore Union Reduced to $19 Million, OREGONIAN 
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2020/03/judge-reduces-jurys-936-million-in-damages-
verdict-against-longshore-union-to-19-million.html. After the plaintiff rejected the remittitur, the judge certified 
the case for interlocutory appeal. Bill Mongelluzzo, ICTSI Portland Rejects $19 Million Award Against ILWU, 
JOC (Mar. 21, 2020, 5:34 AM), https://www.joc.com/port-news/longshoreman-labor/ictsi-portland-rejects-19-
million-award-against-ilwu_20200321.html. 
 7 Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 240 (1952); 
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=750%2C000.00& 
year1=194804&year2=202004 (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). 
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judgment in 1952.8 This was the first major damages judgment to reach the Court 
under the 1947 anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, and the ensuing multi-year battle, in 
the courts and out, for the union’s survival reveals how effectively business 
interests used law to squelch social movement activism. At that time, the ILWU 
was a multiracial, politically progressive, and activist union that was 
transforming labor and the politics of the Pacific West by organizing tens of 
thousands of farmworkers, food processors, and warehouse and dock workers 
into one big democratically governed union.9 Capitalizing on the opportunity 
presented by the verdict, company lawyers sought to use judgment collection 
devices against the ILWU as a way to roll back organizing victories throughout 
the West Coast and in Hawai’i.10 As the ILWU fought to stay afloat, it 
understood law and courts to be on the side of its opponents.11 In the days after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, the ILWU’s newspaper summed up this view with 
a political cartoon: In it, a bespectacled judge floats down from the heavens to 
hand the court’s ruling, labeled “how to break strikes,” to a businessman sporting 
top hat and cigar.12 
The labor movement is a social movement, with a long history of shaping 
law and being shaped by it in turn.13 At times constrained by law and at times 
bolstered by it, the labor movement was one of the largest and most influential 
social movements before 1950.14 Labor activism was crucial to the enactment of 
the New Deal and to the period of relatively lower economic inequality in the 
 
 8 See Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 342 U.S. at 245; infra notes 295–96, and 
accompanying text. 
 9 See infra Part II.A. 
 10 See infra Part II.C. 
 11 See Supreme Court Upholds $750,000 Against ILWU, DISPATCHER, Jan. 18, 1952, at 1 (describing the 
Supreme Court’s decision as proof that the Truman Administration was working with employers “to put unions 
out of business”). 
 12 Phil Drew, The New Strikebreaking Gimmick, DISPATCHER, Jan. 18, 1952, at 2. 
 13 See infra Part I.A (detailing our argument about how to conceptualize a “social movement” and why 
labor—in its various incarnations—must qualify). Importantly, labor organizing is explicitly recognized by law 
as protecting the public interest by “safeguard[ing] commerce from injury” and reducing the tendency of 
unrestrained capitalism to “aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the 
purchasing power of wage earners in industry.” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018). And collective action by workers, 
including strikes, picketing, and boycotting, has been recognized by the Supreme Court for decades as 
foundational to the system in which workers and employers self-regulate. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l 
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489, 493–95 (1960) (noting that the “presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their 
actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts 
have recognized”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02, 104 (1940) (declaring unconstitutional a 
restriction on labor picketing even though it “may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into 
advantageous relations with the business establishment”). 
 14 See Flynn, supra note *; supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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mid-twentieth century United States.15 Today, even following decades of 
deregulation of business and anti-labor decisions by courts and agencies, labor 
unions remain an institutional force for redistribution and economic security.16 
Unions engage in protest, the quintessential social movement activity, to achieve 
their goals.17 Indeed, labor unions create an institutional channel for worker 
protest.18 As illustrated by the wave of labor organizing and protest activity 
during the COVID-19 crisis, unions can organize and mobilize those whose 
interests are overlooked in business and politics as usual.19 The goal of this 
mobilization, organizing, and protest is to challenge aspects of the status quo 
and to redistribute wealth and power from those who have more to those who 
have less.20 And yet, organized labor—and the ways in which it has experienced 
law—has not been a primary case study within the law and social movements 
literature.21 Instead, as labor scholar Jane McAlevey wrote in 2016, there has 
been an “informal gestalt . . . that unions are not social movements at all.”22 
 
 15 See Richard Kirsch, The Future of Work in America: Policies to Empower American Workers and 
Ensure Prosperity for All, ROOSEVELT INST. 2 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/future-work-
america-policies-empower-american-workers-and-secure-prosperity-all/. 
 16 Id. at 3. 
 17 See Baker, supra note 2. 
 18 See Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the U.S. Labor Movement? Union 
Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 100 (1999) (“Unions are part of a legal regime that shapes and 
channels worker organization and activism through specification of legally permissible and impermissible modes 
of collective action and through the law’s very definition of workplace representation.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Alina Selyuhk & Shannon Bond, More Essential Than Ever, Low-Wage Workers Demand 
More, NPR (Apr. 28, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/27/843849435/hometown-heroes-or-
whatever-low-wage-workers-want-more-than-praise. 
 20 See, e.g., Advocate for Social and Economic Justice, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-
do/social-economic-justice (last visited May 12, 2020) (describing how labor unions “re-writ[e] the rules of the 
economy, so they benefit the 99% instead of the wealthy few”). 
 21 As an empirical example of the field’s emphasis, we searched the Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews 
database in December 2019 for “social movement” or “social movements” in article titles. The search produced 
146 articles. Of those articles produced, only seven articles—approximately 5% of the total—focus on the 
experience of the American labor movement. Among the twenty most-cited articles of those 146, i.e. those that 
presumably have had the greatest impact on the field, at best one can be said to substantially engage with the 
American labor movement. In contrast, six of those twenty (30%) emphasize the civil rights movement, and five 
(25%) emphasize some aspect of the women’s movement. 
 22 Her full quote is as follows: 
There’s an informal gestalt in much of academia that unions are not social movements at all: that 
union equates to “undemocratic, top-down bureaucracy.” Yet not all so-called social movement 
organizations (SMOs) fit their own definition of social; many function from the top down as 
much as any bad union . . . Likewise, scholars assume that material gain is the primary concern 
of unions, missing that workplace fights are most importantly about one of the deepest of human 
emotional needs: dignity. The day in, day out degradation of peoples’ self-worth is what can drive 
workers to form the solidarity needed to face today’s union busters. 
JANE F. MCALEVEY, NO SHORTCUTS: ORGANIZING FOR POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 1 (2016) (emphasis 
omitted); see also JOSEPH E. LUDERS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE 57 n.6 
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In this Article, we ask: How might the experiences of the labor movement, 
and, in particular, labor unions as regulated by law,23 prove generative in 
theorizing the relationship between law and social movements? In asking this 
question, we seek to contribute to ongoing efforts to expand the boundaries of 
law and social movements scholarship.24  
Theory-building within the field of law and social movements has at times 
been shaped by its primary case studies, especially the civil rights movement, 
the women’s movement, and the LGBTQ movement. Although a few classic and 
significant works have studied labor, the socio-historically specific ways in 
which the labor movement has experienced law have not fully permeated the 
literature.25 Thinking of organized labor as a primary case of the relationship 
 
(2010) (“Curiously, the labor movement is conventionally ignored by scholars of social movements.”). 
 23 We focus more on unions in this Article than on an important and growing portion of the labor 
movement: workers’ centers and other “alt-labor” organizations. As we discuss in Part III.D, the ways in which 
unions and worker centers differ result, in part, from the ways in which law has regulated labor unions. 
 24 Our discussion focuses on the law and social movements literature and not on the sociological literature 
on social movements or the political science literature on contentious politics (those fields have at times engaged 
in similar line-drawing, see infra note 51). Although generalizing about the content and defining the boundaries 
of the “law and social movements” literature is challenging, one useful synthesis of the field is provided by 
Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 
(2006). Generally, we refer to a body of legal and socio-legal scholarship that attempts to generate theory about 
the relationship between law and social movements. See infra Part I.A and Part I.C.  
Outside of the legal literature, sociologists have studied labor as a movement. See TAMARA KAY, 
NAFTA AND THE POLITICS OF LABOR TRANSNATIONALISM (2011); NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS 
WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014); Kim Voss, The 
Collapse of a Social Movement: The Interplay of Mobilizing Structures, Framing, and Political Opportunities 
in the Knights of Labor, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 227 (Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996). And studies of particular union campaigns have emphasized the 
movement aspects of labor organizing. See, e.g., MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS: 
LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND STRATEGY IN THE CALIFORNIA FARM WORKER MOVEMENT (2009). 
 25 As we detail in Part I.C, labor’s relationship with law has been richly studied by a few law and social 
movements scholars, and by labor law scholars and legal historians, outside of the law and social movements 
canon. See, e.g., SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, BLUE AND GREEN: THE DRIVE FOR JUSTICE AT AMERICA’S PORT (2018) 
(studying law as a tool and a barrier to social movements in the context of movements responding to 
environmental degradation and low-wage work); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (analyzing pay equity through a law and social 
movements lens). A work that has crossed over from the field of labor legal history to become part of the law 
and social movements canon considers the labor movement experience in depth. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW 
AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 168–72 (1991). Among the many rich labor histories 
that are relevant for studying the intersection of labor and other social movements are DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, 
DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) and ROBERT RODGERS 
KORSTAD, CIVIL RIGHTS UNIONISM: TOBACCO WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE MID-
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTH (2003). Works that shed light on the effect of law on labor as a movement include: 
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1991); Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning Something of Legislation”: The Judiciary in the History of Labor Law, 
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 151 (1994) (surveying the literature on the effect of law on the American labor 
movement); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American 
FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:01 PM 
2020] PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW 69 
between law and social movements accordingly has the potential to complicate 
some of the more taken-for-granted notions in the field, and with them the socio-
legal imaginary of how social movements engage with law. The rights-focused 
movements of the latter half of the twentieth century have a familial resemblance 
in their relationship with law. They are envisioned, especially in the legal 
literature, as coalescing into lawyer-led advocacy organizations that wielded law 
to achieve broad cultural change through rights invocations, but that struggled 
to translate those wins into material gains on the ground.26 The labor movement, 
particularly as it has been regulated by law since 1947, stands out as an 
alternative model for how movements and law intersect.  
In addition, refocusing on labor creates space for a richer theorization of how 
law mediates the relationships among social movements. The Juneau Spruce 
case study shows that law seized upon the strengths of labor as a movement—
its reliance on in-the-streets protest, its promotion of solidarity across entire 
economic sectors and geographic regions, and its institutional power drawn from 
member dues—and regulated them to deprive them of potency.27 As other 
scholars have shown, the social movements that arose later, including the civil 
rights and women’s movements, sought alternate pathways to justice; they 
avoided the legal pitfalls that weakened labor, yet eventually bumped into 
jurisprudential constraints of their own.28 
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we trace the pathways by 
which labor came to be de-emphasized in law and social movements studies and 
 
Labor Laws”, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
Partly in reaction to the limited focus of canonical law and social movements literature, a related field 
is beginning to flourish that focuses on law and organizing. This can be seen in both legal scholarship, see, e.g., 
Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of 
Political Inequality, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical 
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: 
The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing 
Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 10–13 (2005); James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and 
Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 911–13 
(1991); Benjamin I. Sachs, Law, Organizing, and Status Quo Vulnerability, 96 TEX. L. REV. 351, 376–77 (2017), 
and in law school-based law reform projects, see, e.g., Berkeley Law and Organizing Collective, BERKELEY L., 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/experiential/pro-bono-program/slps/current-slps-projects/berkeley-law-and-
organizing-collective/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Workers, Law, and Organizing Clinic, UCLA L., https:// 
curriculum.law.ucla.edu/Guide/Course/6554 (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). Another important forthcoming article 
theorizes that legal scholars should “cogenerate law” by thinking in partnership with current Left social 
movements, including BLM and workers’ movements. Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, 
Movement Law, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2). 
 26 See infra Part I.C. 
 27 See infra Part I.B.I. 
 28 See infra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. 
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discuss how the emphasis on other movements can be understood to have shaped 
the field. We focus on five dimensions of the scholarship that do not fully reflect 
labor’s experiences. 
In Part II, we use our extensive archival work to reconstruct the ILWU’s 
1948 to 1955 struggle against the potentially ruinous Juneau Spruce damages 
judgment; we show how labor’s unique regulatory regime was mobilized by 
opponents to constrain movement activity. The restriction on labor protest 
occurred just as a new cycle of protest began, the “rights revolution” of the 1950s 
(this phrase itself reflects the line-drawing we interrogate, since the 
understanding of certain claims as “rights” is a product of how movements have, 
and have not, engaged with law).29  
In Part III, we draw from this case study to suggest ways in which re-
focusing on labor’s experience with law complicates understanding of the 
relationship between law and social movements, and specifically, how it 
enriches the five dimensions of the field identified in Part I. We also argue that 
reintegrating labor into the literature demonstrates the importance of studying 
the relationships among social movements, as mediated by law, over time and 
space. As one primary example, law helped construct the labor and civil rights 
movements as increasingly distinct from each other, by prohibiting labor unions 
(but not civil rights groups) from engaging in the forms of social movement 
activism—mass picketing and sector-wide boycotts—that came to be the model 
for protest after the 1950s. We conclude with thoughts on the future of labor as 
a social movement. 
As movements today seek to assert more intersectional grievances, the legal 
boundaries that gave movements their shape throughout the twentieth century 
merit further scrutiny. Today, an increasing number of labor organizations 
challenge the multiple inequalities that impact their members’ lives.30 Similarly, 
the “new civil rights movement”—as the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 
have been called—center reforms that would build the welfare state and address 
economic inequality.31 But the ways in which legal constraints have channeled 
 
 29 See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998) (employing the phrase “rights revolution” in an analysis that excludes labor 
unions from its understanding of social movement organizations, during the time period in which labor was 
arguably the most vibrant as a movement). 
 30 See, e.g., SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, www.seiu.org (last visited June 27, 2020) (demanding protection 
for “ALL immigrants” because “unless we act together to protect ALL people we are ALL at risk” and 
announcing SEIU support for the Movement for Black Lives). 
 31 See BLM’s #WhatMatters2020, BLACK LIVES MATTER, www.blacklivesmatter.com/what-matters-
2020/ (last visited June 27, 2020) (announcing that BLM’s #WhatMatters2020 campaign “will focus on issues 
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these movements, and the cultural adaptations that have followed, still have 
sway. Unpacking that history is, as always, essential to escaping it. 
I. THE TIES THAT DIVIDE 
We begin with the puzzle motivating our intervention: labor and other social 
movements have yet to receive widespread study together in the legal or socio-
legal literature (or elsewhere, for that matter). Labor and its experiences with 
law have primarily been studied in one corner of the legal academy, while in 
another corner, the law and social movements literature has focused mainly on 
movements arising in the latter half of the twentieth century and their socio-
historically specific approach to law. This stubborn line-drawing has shaped the 
trajectory of both fields. In section A, we discuss how and why labor and other 
social movements came to be studied separately. In section B, we discuss labor’s 
experience with law. And in section C, we highlight five ongoing conversations 
in the law and social movements literature, which refocusing on labor has the 
potential to complicate. 
A. Enduring Divisions in the Study of Law and Movements 
Labor has often been studied separately from other social movements for a 
number of reasons—some purposeful, and some less so. Here, we trace the 
pathways by which these similar social phenomena came to be conceptualized 
distinctly.  
1. The Dominance of “Rights” 
The interdisciplinary literature on law and social movements is an essential 
resource for legal scholars and practitioners interested in the relationship 
between law and social change. Contained in law reviews, books by legal and 
socio-legal scholars, and interdisciplinary legal and social science journals, this 
literature has often focused on the experiences of the civil rights movement and 
on other movements which, since the 1950s, have made rights claims for 
historically marginalized groups.32 As Scott Cummings recently said, “[t]he 
 
concerning racial injustice, police brutality, criminal justice reform, Black immigration, economic injustice, 
LGBTQIA+ and human rights, environmental injustice, access to healthcare, access to quality education, and 
voting rights and suppression”). 
 32 This emphasis can be seen with some of the earliest works in the field. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978). One 
important social movement that does not fit this mold and has received significant attention in the literature is 
the environmental movement (which we do not theorize in this Article). See, e.g., Alan Hunt, Rights and Social 
Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 309, 318 (1990) (naming “three of the most 
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story of how and why social movements have come to matter within 
contemporary legal scholarship takes off at the moment of crisis within 
progressive legal thought caused by Brown [v. Board of Education].”33 
Catherine Albiston and Gwendolyn Leachman likewise attribute to Brown and 
the civil rights movement the intense scholarly scrutiny of “whether and how 
law operates as an instrument of social change.”34 And as law and society 
scholars Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold have written: “[t]he last half of the 
twentieth century in the United States was, in part, a story of law’s role in 
movements for social change[.]”35 This subject-specific and time-limited 
emphasis has constrained the field’s theoretical horizons, leading to a focus on 
how and why social movements succeed or fail in generating social change via 
law.36 
In contrast, the literature has had less to say about organized labor.37 The 
literature’s ambivalence about theorizing organized labor’s engagement with 
law, from a century before Brown38 through today, is a missed opportunity to 
 
important social movements” as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental 
movement); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Foreword: Two Social Movements, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 331, 331 (1994) 
(arguing that “[t]wo social movements in the last fifty years have had a profound impact on our understanding 
of law and the role of the courts in our system of government[:] . . . the civil rights movement . . . [and] the 
environmental movement”). 
 33 Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 360, 365 (2018) 
[hereinafter Turn]; see Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64 
UCLA L. REV. 1554, 1556, 1556 n.4 (2017) [hereinafter Puzzle] (identifying “the zenith of social movements in 
American politics” as being when Martin Luther King, Jr. led civil rights protesters across the bridge in Selma). 
It is important to note here that Scott Cummings has done some of the best recent work on labor activism, and 
thus, notwithstanding his accurate account of the periodization of the social movement literature, his own work 
does treat labor as an essential part of the contemporary social movement landscape. See CUMMINGS, supra note 
25. 
 34 Catherine R. Albiston & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in 13 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 542, 542 (James D. Wright ed., 2d 
ed. 2015). 
 35 Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An 
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 1 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 
2006) (emphasis added). 
 36 See, e.g., Cummings, Puzzle, supra note 33, at 1556 (noting that social movements “have now achieved 
a privileged position in legal scholarship as engines of progressive transformation”); Edward L. Rubin, Passing 
Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (arguing 
that legal scholarship on social movements, in contrast to the literature on social movements in other disciplines, 
focuses on “the movements’ specific effect on the decisions of courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies”). 
 37 See supra note 21. As we noted above, there are significant exceptions. See supra notes 24–29.  
 38 Labor’s movement activism and struggles with and against law go back to the early nineteenth century, 
if not before. See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 18–49 (1994); 
FORBATH, supra note 25, at 2–8; CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, 
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 36–44 (1985); SEAN WILENTZ, 
CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850, at 33–
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engage with one of the largest and most consequential social movements of the 
twentieth century.39 
2. Seeing Labor as a Social Movement 
To some extent, the exclusion of labor is a purposeful one. While it is 
relatively easy to name the insurgent labor activism of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries a movement,40 organized labor in the decades that 
followed did not always seem like one. Even those most sympathetic to the cause 
questioned whether organized labor was a social movement during the mid-to-
late twentieth century, given its increasing institutionalization, relative political 
moderation, and ongoing failures to actively challenge racism and sexism within 
its ranks.41 In particular, the tendency of some unions during that time to see 
Black, Latinx, and Asian workers (and many recent immigrants) as a threat to 
union power and solidarity, rather than as allies in a common struggle, deeply 
undermined labor’s credibility and efficacy as an agent of reform.42 As a result, 
Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman argued, “organized labor had become more like 
an institutionalized interest group than a social movement.”43  
But the line between interest group and social movement is anything but 
bright, and it has often been tied to normative judgment as much as empirical 
assessment.44 Much of organized labor may have become relatively 
 
35 (20th anniversary ed. 1984). 
 39 Union membership grew from 7.5% of employed workers in 1930 to 19.2% of employed workers in 
1939 to 28.3% of employed workers in 1954. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION 
MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2004) (using Bureau of Labor Statistics data). Counting only 
nonagricultural workers, union membership grew from 28.6% in 1939 (the first year in which data was collected) 
to 35.4% in 1945. Id. Between 1930 and 1941, over 6.8 million people joined unions. Id. 
 40 One of the relatively few canonical law and social movements works on labor focuses on this time 
period. See FORBATH, supra note 25. 
 41 Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the 
American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. SOCIO. 303, 303–04 (2000). 
 42 Racism among union leaders and rank-and-file unions members, was a pervasive problem, particularly 
in certain industries. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2008) (describing racism and anti-Black violence by labor unions in the 
North); BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 
(2001) (describing racism among longshore workers and steelworkers in selected cities nationwide). 
 43 Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 304. 
 44 Scholars have accordingly struggled to articulate a workable definition of a social movement. We do 
not wade into that debate here, other than to say that we think there is value in conceptualizing organized labor 
as one. We note that some scholars have also attempted to distinguish between “social movements” and “social 
movement organizations,” and that as applied to labor, this has resulted in line drawing between “labor 
movements” and “labor unions.” See John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOCIO. 1212, 1217–18 (1977) (distinguishing between social 
movements and social movement organizations); Clawson & Clawson, supra note 18, at 109 (discussing the 
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conventional and bureaucratic in its methods, tepid in its demands, and moderate 
in its vision of an ideal society in the latter half of the twentieth century. Still, as 
Voss and Sherman caution, “[w]e have a fascination with the new and the 
dramatic in the social movement field and are often disdainful of older 
movements. Yet to limit our focus narrows our theoretical vision.”45 Organized 
labor was not as new or dynamic in the 1950s as it was before, and as it may 
appear again now. But, to suggest it was not a social movement goes too far. 
There is value in thinking of organized labor, even in its bureaucratic 
incarnation, as a social movement, even if not every union acts like one.46 Labor 
unions engage in collective action—including protest—for the purpose of 
challenging existing economic and political power relationships. The definition 
of a social movement should be broad enough to encompass working-class 
people’s collective defiance of workplace authoritarianism to seek redistribution 
of both wealth and power. Moreover, to understand the relationship between law 
and social movements, it is essential to see that unions’ mid-century 
conservativism and institutionalization resulted, in part, from how they were 
regulated by law.47 To exclude labor from consideration because of its 
 
paradoxical nature of the institutional labor union as reliant on the labor movement more broadly for its 
existence). While that distinction is important in some contexts, we do not belabor it here. As Clawson and 
Clawson have argued, labor unions must both operate as bureaucratic organizations and also “constitute and 
reconstitute themselves as social movements” in order to achieve their goals. Clawson & Clawson, supra note 
18, at 109. As such, we use the terms “labor movement,” “organized labor,” and “unions” relatively 
interchangeably throughout, except when greater precision is important for our analysis. 
 45 Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 344. 
 46 A number of scholars of labor, both in and outside of law schools, have studied the ways in which 
unions have failed to organize, mobilize, or advocate the interests of people of color, women, or even workers 
generally. See generally, e.g., PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, 
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008) (discussing the experience of African Americans in the 
American labor movement); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767 
(2001) (discussing the ways in which unionization fragments workers from their race, gender, and class 
identities). 
 47 The argument that unions are interest groups rather than social movement actors is, as we have said, 
more normative than descriptive. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. But even where it is an accurate 
description, it oversimplifies and flattens the complex historical process by which labor organizations became 
less committed to mass organization and economic transformation. Exhibit A for the proposition that labor 
unions ceased being social movement actors in favor of being interest groups is the famous comment of AFL-
CIO President George Meany in 1972, when he was asked about declining membership: “Frankly, I used to 
wonder about the . . . size of the membership. But quite a few years ago I just stopped worrying about it, because 
to me it doesn’t make any difference.” REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE 
COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 230 (2015). As Schiller argues, “industrial pluralist labor law that 
developed in the immediate postwar period may have foreclosed a radical reconnection of the role that unions 
were to play in American society” and the increasingly conservative labor law of the 1970s made labor-
organizing well-nigh impossible and reduced labor political power even more. Id. at 231. 
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relationship with law is to miss out on an opportunity to understand how law 
changes a movement. 
The literature on “social movement unionism” (as opposed to “business 
unionism” or just plain unionism) is similarly premised on the argument that not 
all unions act like social movement organizations.48 While we agree with the 
normative critique of unions which fail to prioritize solidarity with other 
marginalized groups, or worse, wield their collective power against such groups, 
we think it confuses the normative and the theoretical to treat organized labor’s 
status as a social movement as conditional. Instead, we see organized labor—
whose power is rooted in protest and whose goal is redistribution—as a social 
movement, however limited and imperfect, in its own right. We find the term 
“social justice unionism” theoretically limiting for similar reasons. 
Distinguishing social justice unionism from unionism generally suggests that 
wages and benefits are not themselves “social justice” issues. Drawing from 
critical race theory, we prefer the term intersectional unionism for the kind of 
unions which seek to address the multiple inequalities in their members’ lives 
and communities.49 
3. Ongoing Boundary Work 
The tendency to overlook labor—both in the law and social movements 
literature and in the disciplinary study of social movements50—is not solely the 
product of purposeful exclusion, however; it also verges on hegemonic.51 It has 
often been taken for granted that labor is fundamentally distinct from other forms 
 
 48 See, e.g., RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK: REMAKING THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
120 (2004) (describing the “practices and possibilities of a social movement unionism” as a distinct form of 
labor activism) (capitalization altered). 
 49 See Hajer Al-Faham, Angelique M. Davis & Rose Ernst, Intersectionality: From Theory to Practice, 
15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 247 (2019). 
 50 Clawson & Clawson, supra note 18, at 96 (noting that “sociologists . . . have devoted surprisingly little 
attention to the labor movement,” and reflecting that “[a]s a discipline centrally concerned with processes of 
institutional functioning, social movement activism, and class differentiation and domination, this relative 
neglect is striking”); see also Gabriel Hetland & Jeff Goodwin, The Strange Disappearance of Capitalism from 
Social Movement Studies, in MARXISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 83, 84–86 (Colin Barker, Laurence Cox, John 
Krinsky & Alf Gunvald Nilsen eds., 2014) (noting that social movement studies have failed to pay adequate 
attention to organized labor and other economic movements in recent decades and have failed to adequately 
interrogate political economy when theorizing movement activity). 
 51 This ongoing line-drawing is evident within the leading academic organizations whose members study 
social movements. In the American Sociological Association, there are separate groups for social movement and 
labor movement research and scholarship, and in the Law and Society Association, there are separate research 
groups for law and social movements and labor rights. See ASA Sections, AM. SOCIO. ASS’N, https://www.asanet. 
org/asa-communities/asa-sections (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Collaborative Research Networks, LAW & SOC’Y 
ASS’N, https://www.lawandsociety.org/crn.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). 
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of collective behavior.52 This is partly about path dependency; organized labor 
emerged well before the other movements prioritized by the field. But it is also 
because of the intractable problem within social movement theory (and arguably 
within all social theory) of how to reconcile the economic and the socio-political. 
We discuss each of these issues, in turn. 
Temporally, labor gained both power and prominence in the early-to-mid 
twentieth century, before the modern conceptualization of a social movement 
fully emerged.53 Owing to its success in gaining institutional power in the 1930s 
and 1940s, labor was no longer seen as a movement; it was an economic 
institution.54 It accordingly was integrated into academia either on its own terms 
(as in “labor studies” or “labor law”) or as part of a broader study of economic 
issues (as in “industrial relations”).55 
The study of social movements, as a category distinct from labor, followed 
a distinct trajectory. Prior to the 1960s, academics tended to view “collective 
behavior” skeptically, largely because Nazism and fascism were the leading case 
studies.56 Engaging in politics outside of the political system was generally 
presumed irrational57 or deviant, because then-dominant pluralist political 
theory asserted that the political system was accessible to all.58 
With the increasing national prominence of the civil rights movement in the 
1950s and 1960s, however, academics began to reconsider their normative and 
empirical approaches to social movements.59 Movements could now be 
understood as a rational reaction to an unequally accessible political system—
and this made them seem worthy of more systematic study.60 Social scientists 
developed resource mobilization and political process theories to explain why, 
 
 52 See supra notes 24, 51, and accompanying text. 
 53 Compare Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 310–11 (discussing the decline of labor as the twentieth 
century progressed), with infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (highlighting the new conceptualizations of 
social movements that began to emerge at the turn of the twentieth century). 
 54 Voss & Sherman, supra note 41. 
 55 See supra note 51. 
 56 See, e.g., SIDNEY G. TARROW, STRUGGLE, POLITICS, AND REFORM: COLLECTIVE ACTION, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, AND CYCLES OF PROTEST 25 (1989). 
 57 Later scholarship would reflect on the irrationality of collective action from a micro-economic rather 
than a political process perspective; and in that account, labor was a principal case study. MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 58 See, e.g., Louis Lindsay, The Pluralist Persuasion in American Democratic Thought, 22 SOC. & ECON. 
STUD. 479, 484–87 (1973). 
 59 See SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: COLLECTIVE ACTION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d. ed. 1998). 
 60 Id. 
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how, and when social movements might rationally emerge.61 Both treat social 
movements as instrumental, strategic action, deploying the resources available 
to them or seizing upon political opportunities, in order to achieve goals.62 With 
the “cultural turn” of the 1980s, scholars began to reincorporate questions of 
meaning-making, culture, identity, and emotions into their analyses of social 
movements, but this time, with the added recognition that politics and law, too, 
involve signification struggles.63 
By the time the study of social movements claimed its own intellectual 
space, there were a number of barriers to incorporating labor as an appropriate 
object of study. Labor was already being studied in other departments and 
schools.64 In addition, labor unions were in decline, both in power and perhaps 
more so in terms of legitimacy as a social movement.65 As noted above, much 
of the New Left deemed the majority of labor unions to be bureaucratic interest 
groups rather than social movement organizations.66 In part, this was because 
labor was no longer a “protest” movement seeking rights from the state.67 
Having gained such rights in the 1930s, labor now largely deployed its power in 
the “private” sphere, seeking redistribution directly from corporations.68 Labor 
was different from other social movement actors: it was institutional, whereas 
social movements were thought to be noninstitutional; it used protest to 
influence business organizations, whereas they used protest to influence state 
policy.69 Moreover, many labor unions were not meaningfully engaged in 
struggles against racial and gender oppression, or other progressive causes, at 
that time.70 
 
 61 See id. at 24–25; see also Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political 
and Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 517, 527 (1999) (arguing that “the civil rights movement was 
the catalyst behind the wave of social movements that crystallized in the United States beginning in the middle 
of the 1960s and continuing to the present”). 
 62 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 63 See James M. Jasper, Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ACROSS DISCIPLINES 59 (Bert Klandermans & Conny Roggeband eds., 2010); see also 
Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 879 (2013) 
(outlining major theoretical advances within the disciplinary study of social movements and how they might 
improve understanding of law and social movements). 
 64 See supra note 51. 
 65 See Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 304, 310–11. 
 66 Id. at 304. 
 67 Id. at 310–11. 
 68 Id. at 310. 
 69 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 70 See, e.g., DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND 
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA (2004) (theorizing women’s involvement in the labor movement as 
separate from the broader feminist movement). 
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The disjuncture between labor movements and other social movements is 
about more than path dependence, though. It also represents the limitations of 
existing theories about the relationship between the economic and the cultural, 
the material and the ideational. Here, the long shadow of Marx and Marxist 
scholarship has often been read to occupy the field of studying class conflict, 
and therefore labor movements.71 And because Marxist scholars were thought 
to be interested only in the working class and not in other potential agents of 
social transformation, social movement scholars have often understood 
themselves to be building a new field of study which would focus on all 
movements but labor.72 
Within the sociological literature on social movements, one theoretical move 
which treats labor as fundamentally different from other movements is the 
distinction drawn between “old” and “new” social movements.73 Here, old social 
movements—of which labor is the paradigmatic example—are understood as 
focusing on material inequalities.74 In contrast, new social movements are post-
material, concerned about identity and ideology.75 While the old-versus-new 
taxonomy has been criticized for its simplicity, the intuition that something about 
social movements changed in the mid-twentieth century continues to shape the 
field. Nancy Fraser has attempted to rehabilitate the “class” versus “identity” 
debate by drawing a distinction between a “politics of redistribution” and a 
“politics of recognition.”76 Yet, as others have noted, even this distinction fails 
to capture the complexity of the issue.77 Labor always fought for dignity, not 
just money; for roses, and not just bread.78 And recognition and inclusion have 
 
 71 See COLIN BARKER, LAURENCE COX, JOHN KRINSKY & ALF GUNVALD NILSEN, Marxism and Social 
Movements: An Introduction, in MARXISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 1–3 (Colin Barker, Laurence Cox, John 
Krinsky & Alf Gunvald Nilsen eds., 2013). 
 72 Some more recent Marxist scholarship has sought to challenge this line-drawing and to use Marx as a 
starting point for understanding all movements. See, e.g., id. 
 73 See, e.g., Alberto Melucci, The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach, 19 SOC. SCI. INFO. 
199, 199–201 (1980). 
 74 Id. at 199–200. 
 75 Id. at 217–22. 
 76 Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and 
Participation, Tanner Lecture on Human Values (Apr. 30–May 2, 1996) (transcript available at the University 
of Utah’s Tanner Lecture Library). 
 77 See Judith Butler, Merely Cultural, NEW LEFT REV. (Jan. 1998), https://newleftreview.org/issues/I227/ 
articles/judith-butler-merely-cultural. 
 78 Indeed, the “bread and roses” metaphor that rejects prioritization of economic over cultural 
transformation as a goal of movement activism comes from a poem adopted as an anthem by women textile 
workers on strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912: 
Our lives shall not be sweated from birth until life closes— 
Hearts starve as well as bodies: Give us bread, but give us roses. 
James Oppenheimer, Bread and Roses, 73 AM. MAG. 214, 214 (1911). 
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material consequences, not merely psychological ones. In other words, there is 
much lost in these categorization schemes. This is not to say that there are no 
meaningful distinctions between these movements; this Article is about many of 
them. Rather, it is to say that those distinctions are not inevitable, but 
constructed; things to be explained rather than assumed. In Part III.C, we argue 
that law, coupled with socio-historic contingency, has played an undertheorized 
role in building these movements as separate and apart from each other.  
Similar theoretical assumptions color legal scholarship’s disparate treatment 
of labor and other movements. Scott Cummings explains how class and race 
have been relegated to entirely different jurisprudential areas: the class-based 
perspective of legal realists and critical legal scholars, on the one hand, and the 
race-based perspective of mid-twentieth century liberals, progressives, and 
critical race scholars, on the other.79 He argues that the first category of theorists, 
consistent with a Marxian understanding of the limits of “political freedom” 
under law, tend to be skeptical of the judiciary’s ability to effect progressive 
change and rely, instead, on the political branches.80 In contrast, those who came 
of age with a reverence for the Warren Court tend to view the judiciary as a 
powerful check on the majoritarian political process, and as an essential defender 
of minority rights.81 Cummings argues that insights from labor have largely been 
incorporated into critical legal studies, whereas insights from other movements 
dominate the law and social movements literature.82 
In another variation on this theme, Edward Rubin conceptualizes the 
jurisprudential importance of social movements and argues that the “social” 
represents a separate category of human action, distinct from both the 
“economic” and the “political.”83 He posits that the study of law and social 
movements is about conceptualizing how the social can be generative of law in 
the same way that the economic and the political can be.84 Under this scheme, it 
is unclear if labor, or other movements that are regarded as partially or fully 
economic in goals and orientation, should even qualify as social movements. 
Yet, from a law and political economy perspective, such an understanding of the 
economic as a separate sphere from the socio-political is itself a hallmark of the 
neoliberal era, which has done much to naturalize increasing economic 
inequality (and the weakening of labor unions) as an economic necessity rather 
 
 79 Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 365–68. 
 80 Id. at 366–67. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 367–68. 
 83 Rubin, supra note 36, at 3–5. 
 84 Id. 
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than a socio-political choice.85 Consistent with this dichotomy between the 
economic and the socio-political, some of the law and social movements 
scholarship that does consider labor unions has tended to distinguish their 
“movement” aspects from their “bread and butter” work fighting for wages and 
benefits for low- and middle-income people. For example, most of Lani 
Guinier’s and Gerald Torres’ account of the United Farm Workers focuses on 
Teatro Campesino and almost none focuses on strikes, boycotts, or contracts.86 
At the same time, a growing body of scholarship challenges these 
constructed boundaries between the labor movement (or worker activism more 
generally) and other social movements. For example, Michael McCann, Scott 
Cummings, Kate Andrias, and Ben Sachs, among others, study labor as a 
movement.87 McCann’s influential book, Rights at Work—now part of the law 
and social movements canon—focuses on campaigns for pay equity both 
through legislation and litigation, and through unions’ organizing in 
workplaces.88 In this Article, we build upon their work to more directly 
interrogate the boundaries of the field, and to explore how refocusing on labor 
enriches the study of the relationship between law and social movements. 
B. Labor as a Social Movement 
Although labor has not been a primary case study within canonical law and 
social movements literature, labor movement activism has been extensively 
studied within legal academia, by labor law scholars and legal historians. In this 
section, we review the literature on labor and law. 
1. Law as the Problem 
The literature on organized labor’s encounters with law is vast and has varied 
over time. While some early labor scholars saw reason for optimism about what 
 
 85 See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 
1–2 (2019); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 655–56 (2014) (reviewing 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)). 
 86 See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law 
and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2786–91 (2014). 
 87 See MCCANN, supra note 25; MICHAEL W. MCCANN & GEORGE I. LOVELL, UNION BY LAW: FILIPINO 
AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISTS, RIGHTS RADICALISM, AND RACIAL CAPITALISM (2020); SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, AN 
EQUAL PLACE: LAWYERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LOS ANGELES (2020); Andrias & Sachs, supra note 25; Michael 
M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2019). 
 88 See MCCANN, supra note 25. To be clear, Rights at Work does not claim to be a study of law and social 
movements; it is about legal mobilization by workers and how law shapes, as constraint and opportunity, 
struggles for change in the workplace. Id. at 9–11. 
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law might do for labor,89 most have theorized law as a mechanism of control 
imposed on movement activism, rather than a tool proactively wielded by 
movements. 
Prior to labor’s precipitous decline after 1970, a decline seen as tied to an 
increasingly archaic and constraining legal regime, labor law scholars tended to 
be more sanguine about law.90 Given massive state repression of labor in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, many scholars initially saw the New Deal era laws that 
protected labor organizing as important victories for the labor movement.91 
These laws—the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,92 which prohibited injunctions 
in labor disputes, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA or 
Wagner Act),93 which protected the right to organize, collectively bargain, and 
strike—helped shield labor protest from state repression and legitimized 
workers’ rights to engage in collective action.94 
 
 89 See generally, e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 
1), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947) (exploring the possibilities offered to labor by the Wagner Act); Matthew W. 
Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984) (critiquing two scholars positing the 
deradicalization of the labor movement by courts after the Wagner Act); Harry Schulman, Reason, Contract, 
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955) (speaking positively about the law and reason 
underlying the collective labor agreement system). They came in for a great deal of criticism in the 1970s and 
1980s for articulating a vision of labor law that failed to protect labor’s right to build worker power. See, e.g., 
Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483, 
483 n.2 (1981); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the 
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). Blame has also been placed 
on courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for interpreting the statutes in a way that subverted 
the power they gave labor. See generally JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR 
RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (1995) (discussing the NLRB’s lack of consistency toward labor policy over the 
years and the Court’s history of substituting its policy preferences for those of Congress); Karl Klare, The 
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 265, 269 (1978) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s early decisions interpreting the Wagner Act 
narrowed the range of legitimate labor activity and thereby “did . . . much to guide the long-run development of 
the labor movement into domesticated channels and, indeed, to impede workers’ interests”); Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (critiquing the 
industrial pluralist model and the relationship between courts and the NLRB that underlies it). Nevertheless, 
even the critics of labor law regard the fundamental principle of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—the 
right of a subset of employees to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection—as being a core 
aspect of legal protection for movement building. See Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417, 
1423 (1984) (noting that, “[m]ore than any other institution in capitalist society, the labor movement is based on 
communal values,” and that the Critical Legal Studies critique of rights rhetoric “misses the mark when it applies 
its critical analysis to the right to engage in concerted labor activities”). 
 90 See supra note 89. 
 91 See supra note 89. 
 92 47 Stat. 70 (1932); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115. 
 93 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–166. 
 94 In addition to some of the early work cited above, supra note 89, recognizing the potential of law to 
protect labor against repression, some recent work has credited vigorous enforcement of the Wagner Act with 
enabling labor movement success in social and economic transformation. See MOON-KIE JUNG, REWORKING 
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But labor (with the significant exceptions of agricultural and domestic 
workers and independent contractors) won these limited rights decades ago.95 In 
the years since, labor has lost much more than it has won via the state. The most 
important of these losses was the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.96 Enacted by the first 
Republican-dominated Congress since the passage of the NLRA, it amended the 
statute to sharply restrict the rights of workers to act collectively through 
unions.97 And as labor has increasingly struggled in recent decades under this 
amended regulatory regime, law has, in turn, increasingly been seen by scholars 
as a tool of social control, blunting whatever transformative potential the labor 
movement once had.98 
The mechanisms by which law has been understood to bridle labor are 
varied, but the basic theme is straightforward—in any number of ways, the state 
has suppressed concerted activity that threatened capitalism. Criminal law made 
unionization illegal in most places until as late as the 1930s.99 Injunctions against 
strikes from the 1870s to 1932 (in federal courts), and even later (in state courts) 
deterred activism, by forcing workers back to work.100 Lawyers for business in 
the three decades after the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 created 
a framework for narrowing the permissible scope of worker collective action.101 
Restrictions on picketing and boycotts deprived workers of the ability to form 
 
RACE: THE MAKING OF HAWAII’S INTERRACIAL LABOR MOVEMENT 110–22 (2006) (recounting the history of 
labor organizing in Hawai’i and explaining its eventual success in the 1940s as being in part due to enforcement 
of Wagner Act). 
 95 See Pope, supra note 89, at 15–17. 
 96 61 Stat. 136 (1947); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–188. 
 97 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–188. 
 98 As Jennifer Gordon summed it up, contemporary “discussions of the NLRA from the union perspective 
are tinged with desperation about what law does for and to organizing[.]” Gordon, supra note 25, at 2; see Klare, 
supra note 89, at 269–70. 
 99 See VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE ORIGINS OF BUSINESS UNIONISM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 30–75 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930, 
66 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988). 
 100 FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (photo reprint. 1963) (1930); 
JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, “IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION”: THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 43–44, 64–65 (2005). Later examples include James B. Atleson, The Legal 
Community and the Transformation of Disputes: The Settlement of Injunction Actions, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
41, 44–45 (1989), an empirical study of all cases between 1974 and 1979 in Buffalo, New York, in which 
employers attempted to enjoin picketing. Id. at 48–51. Atleson found that the cases were resolved mainly through 
negotiation. Id. Restrictions on picketing were imposed in a majority of cases and in the majority of those, 
counsel for the union consented to the restriction (often because it appeared likely that the court would issue an 
injunction). Id. 
 101 See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE 
LIBERALISM 5–9 (1995); Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective 
Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J 969, 1001–16 (2016). 
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common cause with each other and with consumers and the public.102 Fines and 
damages judgments against unions and their members under tort, criminal, and 
antitrust law, and under the Taft-Hartley Act, were often devastating for workers 
and their unions.103 
Thus, the skeptical view is that even when law has ostensibly protected the 
right of workers to act collectively, it has still constrained movement activism. 
From this perspective, it was not just the Taft-Hartley Act’s regressive 
amendments to the NLRA that were the problem for labor, it was the NLRA 
getting in the way to begin with.104 Agency determinations of who could bargain 
with whom over what foreclosed the possibility that labor might play a real role 
in co-determining conditions of employment or in countering employers’ market 
power.105 The eagerness of the NLRB and courts in the 1940s to impose the rule 
of law on labor militance channeled labor activity into bargaining dominated by 
union leadership at the expense of the rank and file.106 Labor’s social movement 
activism was put on hold, both by law and by “voluntary” restraint of union 
leaders who feared being deemed unpatriotic during World War II,107 and the 
labor movement never recovered. 
For labor law scholars, the once-provocative thesis that even the NLRA as 
enacted was part of the problem has now become a consensus view.108 The 
liberal legalism of the NLRA preserved rather than upended relations between 
 
 102 See, e.g., Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and 
Boycotts, 1891–1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 32 (1989); Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1845, 1849–51 (2018). 
 103 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., A STRIKE LIKE NO OTHER STRIKE: LAW AND RESISTANCE DURING 
THE PITTSTON COAL STRIKE OF 1989–1990, at 193–98 (2002); ERNST, supra note 101, at 149–55; AHMED WHITE, 
THE LAST GREAT STRIKE: LITTLE STEEL, THE CIO, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR RIGHTS IN NEW DEAL 
AMERICA 237 (2016). 
 104 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 105 TOMLINS, supra note 38, at 132–40; Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal 
Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915–1943, 11 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 79–84 (1993). 
 106 See, e.g., Klare, supra note 89, at 290, 336; James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right 
to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 533–34 (2004); David M. Rabban, Has the NLRA Hurt 
Labor?, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 422–27 (1987). 
 107 See Klare, supra note 89, at 270 n.16; see also NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME: THE 
CIO IN WORLD WAR II (2003) (discussing the role of World War II in diminishing the CIO’s movement activism 
by institutionalizing union leadership and delegitimizing the activities of the rank and file). 
 108 See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5–6, 13–17 (2016); Cynthia L. Estlund, 
Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 307 (1994); Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor 
Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 375 (2007); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ 
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776–77 (1983). 
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labor and capital,109 and the Taft-Hartley Act was just the nail in the coffin rather 
than the mortal blow. 
And yet, it is worth asking whether this should be the end of the story. Below 
we argue that the elision of labor within law and social movements scholarship 
can be seen to have limited the theoretical horizons of that field. But for scholars 
who seek to understand the American labor movement, the failure to consider 
labor as one movement among many may have been limiting too. For labor law 
scholars, labor has often been seen as sui generis, as a movement which must be 
understood on its own terms. A strand of law and social movements scholarship, 
having failed to consider the struggles of organized labor, may be too optimistic 
about law’s possibilities. On the other hand, a strand of labor law scholarship 
may have too bleak an assessment of law.110 One ongoing critique of the 
American labor movement is that it has been overly suspicious of state power 
and law, and too confident about what it could accomplish solely through private 
ordering.111 If this critique is correct, labor’s historical resistance to using public 
law as a resource may itself be constitutive of American exceptionalism. 
2. Lawyering for the Labor Movement 
The labor law literature has devoted less attention to the role of lawyers than 
 
 109 SCHILLER, supra note 47, at 83–86; Stone, supra note 89, at 1516–17 (arguing that labor law “serves 
as a vehicle for the manipulation of employee discontent and for the legitimation of existing inequalities of 
power in the workplace”). 
 110 Many law and social movements scholars have been highly critical of law’s possibilities. See, e.g., 
Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal Advocacy Organizations in Social 
Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 35, at 145, 158–59 (listing numerous 
arguments within the literature which question the value of law as a mechanism for achieving social change). 
Conversely, many labor scholars see potential value in the law. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 68, 68–71 
(describing a cycle in which sometimes law presents opportunities and sometimes it is an “albatross” around the 
neck of labor); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized 
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 68–96 (1993) (proposing changes to labor law that would empower workers). 
Scholars other than labor lawyers likewise suggest a range of possibilities for the role of law in the labor 
movement. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 16–17 (2007) (explaining that in the 
1940s, courts were poised to afford collective labor rights a central importance in civil rights); Robin Stryker, 
Half Empty, Half Full, or Neither: Law, Inequality, and Social Change in Capitalist Democracies, 3 Ann. Rev. 
L. & Soc. Sci. 69, 74 (2007) (noting that under the Wagner Act, increased labor militancy was associated with 
gains in membership for the first and only time, suggesting that law increased the power of labor movement 
activism in ways it had not experienced before, and has not experienced since, the Taft-Hartley amendments). 
Yet, on the whole, the law and social movements literature has tended to see more hope in law than the labor 
law literature.  
 111 See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace 
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1394 (1993) (noting that a “deep-seated ideological unwillingness to 
embrace aggressive government intervention in labor relations debilitated organized labor as much as its 
diminishing size and its failure to achieve prominence in a partisan coalition”). 
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the literature on law and social movements. Because of the importance of 
lawyers to our case study, we briefly summarize what is known about labor 
lawyers here. 
Labor lawyers were among the earliest cause lawyers, although they have 
rarely been recognized as such.112 Labor lawyers were drawn to the labor 
movement because of their commitment to the cause, too.113 But consistent with 
labor’s experience of law as a constraint imposed upon them, these lawyers 
largely did not litigate to establish new rights.114 To be sure, some of their work 
involved enforcing statutory or contractual protections, and occasionally 
protecting movement members from civil or criminal liability for activism.115 
But a major part of their role was to help the organizations comply with onerous 
legal requirements and defend the organizations when their members’ activism 
transgressed specified legal boundaries.116 
Some of these lawyers were an important yet neglected part of the apparatus 
by which courts and the NLRB restrained labor activism. As Katherine Stone, 
Reuel Schiller, and others have explained, these attorneys imposed a pluralist 
vision that treated labor and management as interest groups whose bargains 
would be enforced; yet, the law denied many substantive rights to labor, all the 
while leaving corporate power untouched.117 When law required arbitration and 
limited strikes, picketing, and boycotts, the apparatus of industrial pluralism put 
even radical labor lawyers in the position of being cops in disciplining 
movement activism.118 Exactly how law and lawyers did this is best understood 
through archival analysis. We do so in Part II.119 
 
 112 See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 217–20 (1976); Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 106–08 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (identifying labor 
lawyers during the New Deal as “cause lawyers” with “commitments to social reform”); William E. Forbath, 
Class Struggle, Group Rights, and Socialist Pluralism on the Lower East Side—Radical Lawyering and 
Constitutional Imagination in the Early Twentieth Century 18–19 (Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, 
No. 712, 2019), www.ssrn.com/ssrn-id=3485241. 
 113 Gordon, supra note 112, at 107. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 SCHILLER, supra note 47, at 19–22; Stone, supra note 89, at 1513–14. 
 118 See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role 
of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457 (2000) (asserting that lawyers inside 
corporations conceptualize their role in one or more of three ways, as cops policing the conduct of their clients, 
as counsel advising their clients, and as entrepreneurs aiding their clients achieve business goals). 
 119 One of the advantages of a historical approach to analyzing the role of lawyers in movement work is 
that it enables examination of attorney-client communications, something that is rarely possible for more 
contemporaneous movement activity. In the course of one of the many conversations between ILWU staff and 
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C. Five Dimensions of Law and Social Movements Studies 
In this section, we turn to a brief survey of the law and social movements 
literature, emphasizing five dimensions in which refocusing on labor has the 
potential to be most productive. Our survey aims neither at comprehensiveness, 
nor at critique, but at identifying those conversations in which organized labor 
adds something to the story.  
1. Where Law and Movements Intersect 
Arguably the most defining feature of law and social movements scholarship 
is its emphasis on the ways in which movements proactively engage with the 
law. As the leading association of law and social movements scholars introduces 
the field: “Social movements use a wide variety of legal strategies—including 
litigation, lobbying, and administrative advocacy—in their programs for social 
change . . . . [M]ovements rely on rights to frame their grievances, to generate 
and circulate collective identity, and to recruit and mobilize activists.”120 In other 
words, movements engage in what scholars call “legal mobilization.”121 
Consistent with this vision, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres frame the study 
of law and social movements as “demosprudence.”122 Demosprudence, they 
argue, describes “the ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can 
permanently alter the practice of democracy by changing the people who make 
the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”123 Through mobilizing 
law, movements create social change. 
The literature is not always sanguine about the consequences of movements 
invoking law. In fact, the literature is often quite critical of law’s potential as a 
 
their attorneys during the mid-century dispute we detail below, ILWU staff remarked on the importance of 
attorney-client confidentiality: “You will bear in mind, I am sure, the possible use which an employer or a court 
could make of this letter if it fell into their hands.” Letter from Lincoln Fairley, Research Director, ILWU, to 
Allan Brotsky, Attorney, Gladstein, Andersen, Resner & Leonard (Feb. 5, 1951) (on file with the Labor and 
Archives and Research Center). Historical distance enables examination of these kinds of communications, and 
more granular study of how lawyering changes movements. 
 120 See Collaborative Research Networks, supra note 51 (emphasis added). 
 121 “Legal mobilization” is a term that has been subject to “conceptual slippage” in its diverse uses. Emilio 
Lehoucq & Whitney K. Taylor, Conceptualizing Legal Mobilization: How Should We Understand the 
Deployment of Legal Strategies?, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 166, 168 (2020); see also Lisa Vanhala, Legal 
Mobilization, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/ 
document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0031.xml# (last updated Feb. 22, 2018). Here, we use the 
term in a broad sense, to refer to movements’ strategic use of law, broadly conceived, including formal legal 
claims, as well as “legal norms, discourse, [and] symbols.” Vanhala, supra. 
 122 Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2749–56. 
 123 Id. at 2750. 
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tool of social transformation. As the title of Rosenberg’s famous inquiry, The 
Hollow Hope, suggests, much compelling research contends that legal change 
may not always result in the social change movements desire.124 Similarly, 
socio-legal scholars have emphasized that there are a host of downsides for 
movements that use law as a tactic in order to achieve extra-legal goals.125 
Notably, the description of the field set forth above concludes with the caveat 
that “law and legal strategies can exert a conservative influence on social 
movements, channeling protest and more radical forms of action into 
conventional political institutions.”126 There is, accordingly, much in the 
literature that suggests movements should not focus so much on either law 
reform or litigation. Yet, descriptively, the literature still suggests they do.127 
Less emphasized, then, are the ways in which law is imposed on movements, 
or how and why movements eschew law. This theme has often been relegated to 
a separate body of scholarship—the study of law and authoritarian states.128 But, 
as some of the classic exceptions to this taxonomy illustrate, law is used as a 
form of social control in democratic regimes as well. For example, in his now-
classic work, Steven Barkan complicates the prevailing narrative of the role of 
law within the civil rights movement, arguing that “the legal system proved a 
mixed blessing,”129 because at the same time that federal courts were providing 
some formal redress, the “entire legal machinery of the South” was also being 
deployed to repress movement activity.130 Similarly, Luis Fernandez’s account 
of social control of the anti-globalization movement in the United States found 
local regulation an effective means of quelling protests.131 Michael McCann and 
 
 124 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991) (discussing the limited success of courts in producing significant social reform in a variety of 
areas, including civil rights, abortion rights, and women’s rights, among others). 
 125 See, e.g., Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s 
Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667 (2014). 
 126 See Collaborative Research Networks, supra note 51. 
 127 Making this assumption explicit, Ed Rubin states, “[w]hile there are probably social movements that 
ignore the political sphere—one example that comes to mind is Trekkies—the great majority . . . are deeply 
committed to law reform.” See Rubin, supra note 36, at 51. 
 128 For a review of this literature, see Lynette J. Chua, Legal Mobilization and Authoritarianism, 15 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 355 (2019).  
 129 Steven E. Barkan, Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement, 49 AM. SOCIO. REV. 552, 554 
(1984). 
 130 Id. at 554–59. 
 131 LUIS A. FERNANDEZ, POLICING DISSENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE ANTI-GLOBALIZATION 
MOVEMENT 68–91 (2008). Elsewhere, we also note that Kim Voss’s classic work on the decline of the Knights 
of Labor also shows how law is imposed on movements using the example of the systematic and effective efforts 
to use law to exterminate the radical Knights of Labor in the nineteenth century. Voss, supra note 24. 
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George Lovell also emphasize the repressive aspects of law that govern low-
wage work and workers.132 
Yet, these pieces are still the exception. And few canonical pieces begin with 
where labor started and ultimately landed, thinking about law as a tool imposed 
on popular agitation, as something to be avoided. Nor is it common to consider 
whether or why certain movements have chosen not to prioritize legal change 
and have, in fact, sought to avoid engagement with law.133 
The literature’s emphasis on movements that seek legal change (and 
particularly on those that do so in courts) has contributed to corollary 
assumptions which shape the field—that social movements tend to advance 
minoritarian causes rather than majoritarian ones, and that they turn to law as a 
corrective to failed political processes.134 Again, to quote Guinier and Torres, 
“movements are one way that minorities in a majoritarian democracy protect 
their rights . . . [S]ocial movements enable those who are shut out of a 
majoritarian political process to nonetheless open up nodes in the decision-
making practices of a democratic society.”135 
There is a neatness in understanding the scope of the law and social 
movements inquiry to be primarily about the relationship between courts and 
minority groups. Consistent with the Carolene Products answer to the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, this paradigm imagines that social movements come 
before the court when the electoral process fails them.136 Under these specific 
circumstances, it is legitimate for courts to make policy.137 Yet, the relationship 
between law and social movements is often not so neat. Many movements claim 
 
 132 MCCANN & LOVELL, supra note 87; see George I. Lovell, Michael McCann & Kirstine Taylor, 
Covering Legal Mobilization: A Bottom Up Analysis of Wards Cove v. Atonio, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 81–
88 (2016). 
 133 The literature on marriage equality considers at some length the debates among movement activists 
over whether to prioritize litigation or legislation to establish recognition of same sex marriages as opposed to 
other goals. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Democracy and the Marriage 
Equality Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662 (2017). 
 134 Because these assumptions tend to be unstated, the definition of a “minoritarian” movement can itself 
be unspecified. Historically and theoretically, the meaning of a “minority” movement is contested and tends to 
be based to some extent on actual numbers and to some extent on political power. 
 135 See Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2756–57. 
 136 In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court set forth a new logic of judicial review, 
emphasizing that the judicial branch would largely defer to the political branches when it came to economic 
regulation, but would be more likely to intervene when majoritarian processes harmed minorities or infringed 
on fundamental rights. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
 137 See Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 362–63 (arguing that minoritarian social movements convince 
the broader public, thereby allowing courts to adopt new judicial interpretations of the law, which are consistent 
with majoritarianism). 
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to speak on behalf of, or at least for the benefit of, majorities; and many 
movements consider both political and judicial mobilization to be part of their 
tactical tool kits. 
One further consequence of the legal change and minoritarian assumptions 
of the field is that there tends to be a disproportionate focus, especially by legal 
scholars, on constitutional claims-making. William Eskridge, for instance, 
writes about how “identity-based social movements” revolutionized 
constitutional law in the latter half of the twentieth century.138 With fidelity to 
the Carolene Products framework, he argues that “courts were a natural forum 
for politically marginalized minorities to resist their subordination.”139 He 
continues, “[f]or each [group], the social movement’s political arguments were 
translated into constitutional arguments.”140 Similarly, Guinier and Torres 
contend that “social movements challenge, and, if successful, change governing 
norms, creating an alternative narrative of constitutional meaning.”141 All of 
that is true. As we discuss in Part III, however, this vision of social movements 
overlooks movements—like labor—that have long worried that constitutional 
claims offered more peril than promise.142 
2. What a Movement Looks Like 
A second tendency in the literature has been to conceptualize movements as 
non-institutional. This is, to some extent, a threshold definitional issue, and one 
of the reasons why labor has long been excluded from the field.143 For instance, 
Charles Tilly’s classic definition of a social movement is “[a] sustained series of 
 
 138 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2071 (2002) (positing that the expansion 
of constitutionally-protected individual rights was the result of identity-based social movements, including the 
civil rights movement, the women’s rights movement, and the gay rights movement). 
 139 Id. at 2070. 
 140 Id. at 2071 (emphasis added). 
 141 Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2757 (emphasis added). 
 142 See Andrias, supra note 108, at 83–84, 84 n.400; Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to 
Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 513, 527 (observing that “[i]n many respects, the First Amendment strategy for 
advancing labor’s rights was a risky one”); infra Part III. 
 143 There is a similar debate in broader social movement literature about the extent to which social 
movements can be organized and institutionalized. See, e.g., McCarthy & Zald, supra note 44, at 1236–38. While 
some scholars contend that social movements are at most “loosely organized,” others have a more capacious 
understanding of social movements, which includes social movement organizations. But see Doug McAdam, 
Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 735, 736–37 n.4 (1983). Some scholars 
argue that social movements become more formal and institutionalized as they age. Suzanne Staggenborg, The 
Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 585, 
598, 604 (1988). While labor’s institutionalization is partly the product of the age of many unions, it is also a 
result of labor’s distinct relationship with state power. 
FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:01 PM 
90 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:63 
interactions between power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak 
on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation.”144 Similarly, Guinier 
and Torres define social movements as “those who were not part of the ‘consent 
community’ and who challenge the legitimacy of those rules that flowed from 
the period of their exclusion or those rules that continue to exclude them.”145 
Social movements are groups insufficiently institutionalized to have a seat at the 
table.146 
This conceptualization frames social movements as having a specific 
relationship with power—challenging those who have it, not necessarily 
wielding it themselves. Movements make claims, whether legal, political, or 
cultural, against power-holders, but they do not become power-holders. As a 
result, the literature has focused less than it might on the trade-offs entailed in 
choosing among various organizational forms of, and paths to, institutional 
power. Moreover, it has devoted little attention to the private and public law 
mechanisms that regulate how institutionalized movements operate.147 
Again, there are exceptions to these generalizations. Some scholars have 
studied how different social movements take different forms, each with specific 
advantages and disadvantages. For instance, Luis Fernandez discusses the ways 
in which the non-institutionalized nature of the anti-globalization movement 
allowed it to evade some forms of state control, while making it uniquely 
susceptible to others.148 At the other end of the spectrum, Catherine Albiston and 
Laura Beth Nielsen have shown how the funding of public interest law 
organizations—and by implication, an institutional structure reliant on such 
funding—shapes the substance and scope of their reform agendas.149 
 
 144 Charles Tilly, Social Movements and National Politics, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
297, 306 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984) (emphasis added). 
 145 Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2751 (emphasis added). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Reva Siegel has argued that one characteristic of social movements is that they lack public 
accountability. See Reva Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States Constitutional 
Law 14 (2014) (available at https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_ 
Jurisgenerative_Role_of_Social_Movements.pdf). While such line-drawing helps distinguish social movements 
from political representatives, we think it overly simplifies the regulatory context in which labor unions and 
other social movements exist. There are a number of statutory, common law, and constitutional law doctrines 
which are designed to ensure “public accountability” by social movement organizations, and consistent with our 
argument about the role of law in channeling movement activity, we think those merit greater study as well. 
 148 FERNANDEZ, supra note 131. 
 149 Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law 
Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 88–92 
(2014); see also Megan Ming Francis, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement 
Capture, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 305–06 (2019) (discussing movement capture of the NAACP by the 
Garland Fund). 
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Importantly, both pieces find that organizational form matters a great deal for 
how social movements experience law.150 
And yet, even these pieces do not fully help theorize labor’s experience. 
Labor has often been treated differently than other movements precisely because 
of its institutionalization—because rather than making claims against power-
holders, it has often sought primarily to be left alone, to exercise power 
independently of the state. Bringing labor back into the conversation allows for 
greater theorization of the trade-offs social movements face in negotiating their 
relationships with power. 
3. The Role of Lawyers 
A third emphasis within the literature on social movements, cause lawyers, 
and social change has been on the ways in which lawyers come to dominate 
movements. Gwendolyn Leachman sums up this bent in the literature as follows: 
“Movement lawyers, the argument goes, dominate the attorney-client 
relationship in their pursuit of impact litigation, substituting their own legal 
priorities for the more radical goals of their activist clients.”151 Most scholars are 
critical of the domineering lawyer, or, at minimum, concerned about the ways 
in which lawyer leadership disempowers other movement actors.152 At the same 
time, scholars also recognize that lawyers can be effective in organizing 
campaigns, mobilizing people, and achieving real change on the ground.153 
 
 150 FERNANDEZ, supra note 131; Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 149. 
 151 Leachman, supra note 125, at 1669. 
 152 See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 35, at 3–4, 6–7. 
 153 In addition to Leachman’s nuanced approach following the quote, see Leachman, supra note 125, at 
1669, McCann has also recognized that lawyers can be empowering to movements. MCCANN, supra note 25, at 
292 (noting the ways lawyers empowered the pay equity movement). As McCann and Silverstein powerfully 
summed up the criticism, before going on to challenge it, lawyers, animated by a belief in the power of rights 
and their own career goals, “tend to infuse movements with the misleading and mythical promise of legal 
justice,” which “can crowd out alternative substantive agendas, organizational approaches, and tactical actions.” 
Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social 
Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 263 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). But it is important to note that 
McCann and others have shown that lawyers are diverse in their relationships and contributions to movements 
and have played significant roles in facilitating movement activism. See, e.g., id. at 286–87. Scott Cummings 
also has studied ways in which lawyers contributed powerfully to transformative struggles for equality without 
dominating movements. CUMMINGS, supra note 87. Cummings has theorized “movement liberalism”: whether 
or how lawyers can assist social movements to “mobilize dissent in order to shift politics and culture, thereby 
producing changes in law that reflect and codify social movement goals.” Cummings, Puzzle, supra note 33, at 
1559; see Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 363–65, 382–91, 403–05. 
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The primary way in which lawyers have been shown to dominate movements 
is by reshaping movement strategy around legal goals. Lawyers theorize 
grievances as rights claims. Lawyers may also be on the defensive, since 
“mobilization from below begets counter-mobilization from above,”154 and 
lawyers must defend past wins against efforts to roll back legal advances. But 
even the literature on backlash generally still portrays social movement lawyers 
as movement entrepreneurs, shaping movement strategy.155 Even when studying 
how lawyers defend protesters against criminal charges or civil claims, scholars 
emphasize how skillful lawyering can mobilize activists and engender public 
support.156 
Collectively, these portrayals of lawyers suggest their skill and political 
commitments shape outcomes for clients. Given this, the legal obligations these 
lawyers owe to clients are theorized primarily as a matter of movement 
strategy,157 of networks and efficacy,158 or of professional responsibility.159 
The role that movement lawyers play in assisting social movements in 
avoiding the at-times drastic consequences of running afoul of the law has been 
far less studied. As we discuss in Part III below, labor unions became large 
institutions in the 1930s; collectively, they had millions of dues-paying 
members.160 They had detailed and comprehensive contractual and statutory 
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the employees they represented, their 
 
 154 Stryker, supra note 110, at 87. 
 155 See Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking Foundational Critiques of Lawyers in Social Movements, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2005–14 (2017) (summarizing the literature on backlash, especially as it relates to 
lawyer dominance). An earlier and foundational work explaining why lawyers contribute to the resistance to 
progressive change is Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 149–51 (1974). 
 156 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery 
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989). Kennedy and other scholars of the bus boycott found litigation to be key 
to its success. See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, 1955–1957, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 59 (1991). 
 157 See, e.g., Betty Hung, Essay—Law and Organizing from the Perspective of Organizers: Finding a 
Shared Theory of Social Change, 1 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 4, 23–30 (2009) (articulating an approach to being an 
effective lawyer for a social justice organization). 
 158 ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 
124–48 (2008). 
 159 The classic in this vein is Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). More recent works exploring the issues 
of cause or movement lawyer accountability include Scott L. Cummings, The Accountability Problem in Public 
Interest Practice: Old Paradigms and New Directions, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 
IN CONTEXT 340 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: 
Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 779 (1996); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the 
Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449 (1999). 
 160 See infra Part III.A.2. 
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members, and employers.161 And, both by choice and by statutory command, 
they had more-or-less democratic mechanisms of internal governance.162 
Lawyers did not lead the labor movement. But they did take on an increasingly 
important role in it because their clients had to navigate a complex legal regime, 
and the consequences of a legal misstep could be—as in the case of Juneau 
Spruce—massive. The ways in which labor law conscripted lawyers into these 
roles as a matter of professional obligation is a missed opportunity to understand 
how lawyers impact movements.163 
4. The Mechanisms of Social Change 
A fourth dimension of the field emphasizes the “constitutive” effects of law. 
As socio-legal scholar Robin Stryker aptly sums up the literature, most scholars 
now believe “law’s constitutive power trumps its instrumental power.”164 
The constitutive effects of law can be broadly understood as its “cultural” 
effects—the ways in which legal claims-making alters legal consciousness, 
collective identity, and individuals’ and movements’ sense of efficacy.165 
Material or instrumental effects, by contrast, are the more immediate, 
empirically observable effects of law, such as legally-compelled redistributions 
of wealth or changes of behavior.166 Michael McCann’s classic, Rights at Work, 
is commonly seen as reorienting the field around a constitutive view of how law 
creates social change.167 
 
 161 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 162 Under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, union members have the right to equal 
treatment, to free speech and assembly, to run for union office, to approve dues increases through direct votes 
or delegate conventions, to due process in hearings that might affect the member’s status as a union member, 
and to be free from retaliation for exercising rights under the statute. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 481, 529 (2018). Unions 
are required to hold leadership elections, by secret ballot, every three, four, or five years depending on the type 
of union, and they are permitted to impose only reasonable requirements on eligibility to run for union office. 
Id. at § 481.The statute prohibits use of union or employer funds to support candidates for union office and 
requires unions to mail candidates’ literature to union members at the candidates’ expense. Id. 
 163 For example, in the labor movement, labor lawyers wrote entire handbooks aimed at other lawyers and 
union organizers to help them navigate the legal constraints on union organizing. See STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG 
& JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1983). 
 164 Stryker, supra note 110, at 75. 
 165 See McCann, supra note 24, at 21–22 (distinguishing between instrumentalists/positivists who “tend 
to identify law primarily in instrumental, determinate, positivist terms . . . [and the extent] that official 
institutional actions cause direct, immediate, tangible effects on targeted behaviors” and the 
constitutive/interpretive perspective in which “attention is directed to how legal discourses and symbols intersect 
with and are expressive of broader ideological formations . . . [and] legal conventions are understood as a quite 
plastic and malleable medium, routinely employed to reconfigure relations, redefine entitlements, and formulate 
aspirations for collective living”). 
 166 Id. 
 167 MCCANN, supra note 25. 
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Published in 1994, McCann wrote largely in dialogue with Rosenberg’s The 
Hollow Hope, the then-dominant book in the field.168 Rosenberg’s core 
argument was that the legal victories of the civil rights movement had not 
resulted in the social change movement activists sought; as a result, he believed 
that legal scholars should be less optimistic about courts as a vector of social 
change.169 In response, McCann argued that Rosenberg’s measure of social 
change was too narrow.170 He pointed out, quite rightly, that social change can 
be seen not only in immediate legal change, but also in terms of building 
movements, in the ability of activists to compel formal policy concessions 
through negotiation, and through “a general moral discourse” and “ongoing 
challenges to status quo power relations.”171 According to Scott Cummings, 
“[t]he immediate impact of McCann’s intervention was to frame the new law 
and social movements field precisely around a constitutive view of law, in which 
lawyers and courts were de-centered—a view that affected the methodological 
focus and the kinds of campaigns that those who followed would study.”172 
The focus on constitutive effects was much needed at the time. Law is 
undeniably a discursive and symbolic realm of contestation, in addition to a 
material one, and to focus only on the narrow, instrumental impact of law—what 
a court’s judgment concretely yields—is to miss much of the story. Yet, there is 
a concern that the field may have swung too far in the other direction. For 
instance, Doug NeJaime correctly argues that litigation loss may be a victory 
from a constitutive perspective.173 It can help movements solidify their sense of 
collective identity.174 It can increase attention to an issue.175 And it can increase 
financial support.176 But, as Catherine Albiston has argued, this is far from a 
universal truth.177 While new and insurgent movements may find legal 
mobilization useful, win, lose, or draw, established movements with limited 
resources may have reason to be quite concerned about the material impact of 
law.178 The pre-Wagner Act history of strikes crushed and unions destroyed by 
 
 168 Id. at 136 n.35. 
 169 ROSENBERG, supra note 124, at 336–43. 
 170 See MCCANN, supra note 25, at 290–93. 
 171 Id. at 279–81. 
 172 Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 380. 
 173 Doulas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969 (2011). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
61, 69–71 (2011). 
 178 Id. at 74–77. 
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sweeping injunctions and staggering damages judgments reminds us that 
litigation loss can also shatter a movement.179 
Moreover, as Albiston also highlights, the literature often treats the 
constitutive effects of law as inherently positive, as a “catalyst” to movement 
mobilization.180 But the cultural impact of law can harm movements as much as 
benefit them—a legal win can cause complacency; a legal loss can cause 
hopelessness. In making this argument, Albiston specifically emphasizes labor, 
and the ways in which the legacy of repression in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
caused the labor movement to be uniquely wary of public law.181 Citing Forbath, 
she concludes, “the movement’s interactions with the courts, including its own 
litigation strategies, constituted its identity and its understanding of itself in ways 
that deradicalized what it means to be a labor movement in America.”182 
McCann and Lovell, too, have shown the ways in which repressive judicial 
rulings, along with discriminatory enforcement of criminal law, squelched a 
radical movement of Filipino migrant activists, who were challenging racial 
segregation and abusive working conditions in fish processing plants. As a result 
of their legal losses, many turned away from activism entirely.183  
Labor’s long history with law—over periods of gain and loss, material and 
constitutive—is a reminder that law operates in multiple arenas at the same time. 
This history counsels against over-emphasis on one pathway or one type of 
outcome. As Elizabeth Gurley Flynn suggested, there is both protection and 
repression by law, often simultaneously.184 
5. The Rights Debate 
One final dimension of the literature concerns the conceptualization of 
rights. For decades, law and social movements scholars have sought to 
understand whether the discourse of rights can be empowering for social 
movements and marginalized communities.185 This conversation focuses on the 
 
 179 ERNST, supra note 101, at 149–55; Voss, supra note 24. 
 180 Albiston, supra note 177, at 63, 65 (“Symbolic/strategic proponents are generally more positive about 
law and litigation . . . Constitutive changes of the negative, internal variety . . . are not addressed in the literature 
in the same detail . . . Most scholars seem to assume that changes to collective identity and oppositional 
consciousness are, by definition, positive.”). 
 181 Id. at 75. 
 182 Id. 
 183 MCCANN & LOVELL, supra note 87. 
 184 Flynn, supra note *. 
 185 See, e.g., Amy Bartholomew & Alan Hunt, What’s Wrong with Rights?, 9 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1990). 
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symbolic value of “rights talk,” and the merits of framing movement goals as 
“rights.”186 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, critical legal scholars and critical race 
scholars helped to define the parameters of this conversation. From the canonical 
critical legal studies perspective, Mark Tushnet insisted that rights discourse was 
too indeterminate, unstable, and abstract to further people’s real, on-the-ground 
needs.187 Given the anti-state, formalist origin of rights ideology, it could not be 
a progressive discourse, since for every rights-based argument advanced by 
liberals and progressives, conservatives would be able to advance a more 
resonant, historically-supported, counter-rights argument.188 
In powerful rejoinders, critical race scholars argued that rights rhetoric had 
been too meaningful to those historically without rights to be abandoned.189 In 
the words of Patricia Williams, “[f]or the historically disempowered, the 
conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity; rights 
imply a respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that 
elevates one’s status from human body to social being.”190 While acknowledging 
that the discursive invocation of rights may not itself create systematic change, 
she argued that it was still uniquely empowering to communities seeking 
change—and from a constitutive perspective, that itself was a form of social 
change.191 
Both of these perspectives yield important insights into the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of rights rhetoric writ large. Yet on both sides, the 
claims have at times been relatively undifferentiated—either all rights talk is 
hollow or all rights talk is empowering, with some scholars suggesting that rights 
need not be tethered to doctrine or discourse at all.192 As a result, there has been 
 
 186 As Gwendolyn Leachman explains in her work on legal framing, “[s]ocio-legal scholars conceptualize 
law broadly as both a cultural construct and a symbolic resource . . . and emphasize that informal articulations 
of the law may be only minimally constrained by official legal formulations.” Gwendolyn Leachman, Legal 
Framing, 61 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 25, 27 (2013). 
 187 Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984). 
 188 Id. at 1364. 
 189 See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 414–16 (1987). Defense of the historical importance of rights as a discursive 
framework is not limited to critical race scholars. In particular, historians have noted that rights are significant 
statements of aspirations. See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and ‘the Rights That Belong to Us 
All’, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987). 
 190 Id. at 416; see Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparation, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 329–30 (1987). 
 191 Williams, supra note 189, at 431. 
 192 See Francesca Poletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights 
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comparatively less attention to which rights claims have been effective, for 
which groups, under which circumstances, and for which purposes. 
To be sure, many scholars have drawn lines connecting legal doctrine to 
broader rights discourse to show that the efficacy of rights talk will depend on 
the right at issue, the extent to which it has been part of a recognized discourse 
of rights, and the extent to which it is grounded in foundational rights-granting 
documents.193 As Bartholomew and Hunt have argued, “[r]ights discourses, 
whilst open-ended, do exhibit some structure in that their content is almost 
always located in proximity to the discourses of law, involving claims to 
entitlements that take a form capable of protection and advancement by and 
through legal action.”194 And, in this vein, Tushnet conceded that his argument 
was more about the efficacy of positive rights (e.g., to food and shelter) than 
negative rights (e.g., to be free from government restraint): “the predominance 
of negative rights,” he argued, “creates an ideological barrier to the extension of 
positive rights in our culture.”195 And yet, these nuances have not always been 
emphasized within the broader theoretical debates. 
Organized labor has long struggled with the question of rights rhetoric, in 
part because the kinds of rights that would do the most work for labor—rights 
to association and mutual aid and solidarity in the workplace, to shared 
governance of workplaces and enterprises, and to some substantive standard of 
economic well-being, through wealth and power redistribution—are outside the 
doctrinal and discursive foundations for rights in the United States.196 As such, 
to engage with the experiences of organized labor is to invite a more nuanced 
approach to the power of rights talk. 
* * * 
Collectively, these five dimensions of the literature describe the experiences 
of many social movements at many points in time. As we argue in Part III, they 
tend to reflect one model of a social movement interacting with law, a model 
largely rooted in the civil rights movement’s unprecedented legal victories mid-
century and the impact of those victories on legal theory and popular legal 
consciousness. This model is important and eminently worthy of scholarly 
 
Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 368–69 (2000). 
 193 See, e.g., EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 197 (2013) (noting the absence of positive rights in 
federal constitutional protections, but their relatively greater presence in state constitutions). 
 194 Bartholomew & Hunt, supra note 185, at 7. 
 195 Tushnet, supra note 187, at 1393. 
 196 See Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1592–95 (2016). 
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attention. But it is not the only model. Through our case study from a movement 
whose relationship with law has taken a distinct path, we seek to emphasize the 
socio-historic specificity of each. 
Below, we tell the legal history of the first significant federal damages 
judgment against a labor union since Congress legalized the labor movement in 
the 1930s. It is also a story of how a union and its lawyers struggled to resist the 
movement restraining aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act. Taft-Hartley outlawed the 
tactics—picketing, strikes, boycotts, and political activity—that workers had 
used in the 1930s to organize unions and to exert collective power. In the story 
of Juneau Spruce, what seemed to local union leaders to be an ordinary labor 
dispute about an employer’s breach of a collective bargaining agreement wound 
up as an enormous damages judgment—one so large it could bankrupt the entire 
international union. Employer organizations sought to use the judgment to undo 
one of labor’s biggest organizing wins since the 1930s—the successful 
unionization of the entire agricultural workforce of Hawai’i. 
The Taft-Hartley Act rendered movement activism dangerous by subjecting 
it to injunctions and the threat of ruinous liability. Through detailed archival 
analysis, we show that the effect of law on the movement was not merely a court 
order to stop protesting or to pay money. More subtly, but perhaps more 
powerfully, the new law put union lawyers in the position of policing their 
client’s activism in order to save the union, as an institution, from liability for 
the activism of the rank and file. 
To understand how law shapes social movements, we argue, one must look 
closely at how the labor movement experienced law. And, for the reasons we 
detail below, the story of Juneau Spruce is an ideal place to look. 
II. THE STORY OF JUNEAU SPRUCE 
Emergent labor unions spent the late nineteenth century and the first three 
decades of the twentieth fighting for the right to operate free of state repression. 
In the economic collapse and labor upsurge of the early 1930s, labor ostensibly 
won that right. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, workers could organize unions, bargain collectively, and, 
when necessary, protest poor working conditions through strikes, picketing, and 
boycotts.197 Having won rights to engage in the collective activism that is the 
 
 197 See supra notes 92–93. 
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defining feature of a social movement, the labor movement grew 
exponentially.198 
Labor’s legal victories proved short-lived. In January 1942, some of the new 
rights—especially to strike—were suspended for the duration of the war.199 
When the war ended, the no-strike rules and pledges lapsed.200 But the 
companies refused to meet the pent-up demand for wage increases, as they 
returned to a market economy, without wartime profits.201 A huge strike wave 
ensued.202 And in January 1947, when Republicans took control of Congress for 
the first time since 1932, they made attacking labor’s power a key part of their 
agenda.203 The Taft-Hartley Act reflected the wish list of business interests.204 
Taft-Hartley limited the collective rights labor had won in the 1930s. It 
protected anti-union employers and employees from the efforts of unions to 
organize or to protest unfair practices.205 It authorized the NLRB to seek 
injunctions against labor organizing tactics that violated the new restrictions.206 
It also authorized any person “injured in his business or property” by union 
activities prohibited by the new law to file suit in federal court for damages.207 
Employers lost no time in using the new statutory damages liability as a 
tactic for quelling union activism in the postwar strike wave. The first judgment 
to reach the Supreme Court revealed the full extent of the challenge that unions 
now faced when engaged in movement activism. An Alaskan lumber company 
known as Juneau Spruce sued the ILWU. The ILWU had waged a general strike 
in San Francisco in 1934, had won strikes and good contracts up and down the 
coast, and organized across racial lines.208 Just after the end of World War II, 
the ILWU helped Hawai’ian sugar and pineapple plantation workers unionize, 
forever transforming the Islands.209 The Juneau Spruce case sought to smash the 
union from Alaska to San Diego to Hawai’i. 
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The lawyers who litigated the case for the union were, by any measure, cause 
lawyers, and the union organizing that the ILWU did in the Pacific was social 
movement activism. The lawyers preserved the records of the case.210 It enables 
a close look at law, lawyers, and social movements. And it enables us to consider 
how the law after 1947 channeled labor movement activity, and how that effect 
rippled beyond labor unions to influence the movements that came after. 
A. Labor on the Docks in 1947 
Juneau, for centuries a favorite fishing ground of indigenous peoples, by the 
1930s had a thriving lumber and commercial fishing industry and a population 
of about 5,000.211 In the mid-1930s, longshoremen unionized and secured a 
collective bargaining agreement with the Juneau Lumber Company to load 
lumber onto ships at its lumber mill.212 The company and ILWU Local 16 signed 
successive contracts each year until 1942, the year after the U.S. entered the 
war.213 Because wages were fixed and strikes were prohibited during wartime, 
the mill and the ILWU simply continued the 1942 contract in effect for the war’s 
duration.214 The International Woodworkers Association, CIO, represented the 
mill workers, and the ILWU Local 16 supplied longshoremen whenever the mill 
had enough lumber to load directly from the mill’s dock onto U.S. military-
controlled vessels.215 
By early 1947, lucrative war production was ending.216 A group of investors 
from Coos Bay, Oregon acquired the mill and changed its name to Juneau Spruce 
Company.217 Little else changed at first. The new owners told the mill workers 
they could apply for employment with the new company.218 The mill shut down 
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on Wednesday, April 30 and then reopened on Friday, May 2, under the new 
name but with the same workers.219 Juneau Spruce continued to recognize the 
IWA for its mill workers and continued to use Local 16 longshoremen.220 But 
after the Army terminated its contract with the company in September 1947, 
Juneau Spruce found civilian buyers and decided to ship the lumber on its own 
barges.221 The company also decided that loading could be done more cheaply 
by workers paid on the wage scale of the IWA contract rather than the ILWU 
contract.222 
The company had other reasons to terminate recognition of the ILWU. In the 
autumn of 1947, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was in the midst 
of an epic internal struggle between centrists and leftists.223 It was the early days 
of the Cold War Red Scare, and ILWU President Bridges was rumored to be a 
Communist.224 The Taft-Hartley Act required all union leaders to swear in an 
affidavit that they were not members of the Communist Party, and it had 
forbidden any union whose leaders refused to sign the non-Communist oath to 
invoke the processes of the NLRB.225 Bridges, along with several CIO union 
leaders, refused to sign.226 CIO President Murray pushed Bridges out of his CIO 
leadership position in late 1947 and eventually purged eleven unions, including 
the ILWU, from the CIO.227 This turmoil opened the door to other CIO unions 
raiding the membership of the dissident unions, and companies were happy to 
exploit the dissension, for reasons of anti-Communism, to have less aggressive, 
activist unions with which to negotiate, and to use the dissension in the ranks to 
lower labor costs.228 
What was happening to CIO unions nationwide happened in Alaska. Juneau 
Spruce took the chance to get rid of the ILWU. Verne Albright, who was the 
regional representative of the ILWU, on the International’s payroll but based in 
Alaska, protested to the company that they were changing past practice.229 The 
company insisted that it had not assumed any of the labor or other contracts that 
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had bound its predecessor, so it had no obligation to recognize or bargain with 
the ILWU or to use ILWU men on the docks.230 
In October 1947, the company used IWA men to load a shipment. Albright 
protested, pointing out the longstanding practice and series of contracts 
obligating the company to use ILWU workers.231 The company refused to 
discuss it, insisting it recognized only the IWA.232 Albright, on behalf of the 
ILWU, appealed to the IWA.233 After all, they were both CIO-affiliated unions. 
IWA members in Juneau voted that the work was properly within ILWU’s 
jurisdiction.234 But the company refused to accept the two unions’ resolution of 
the matter.235 Over Albright’s protest, IWA men loaded a second barge in 
January 1948.236 When the company tried to load a third barge in the first week 
of April, the members of Local 16 finally had exhausted their patience, and a 
few men established a peaceful “nominal picket line” at just one of the mill’s 
many entrances with signs saying, “Locked out by Juneau Spruce.”237 
IWA workers refused to cross the picket line.238 Rather than negotiate with 
the ILWU, the company decided to shut the mill down temporarily.239 Although 
“5 or 6 young kids” were initially willing to cross the picket line, said an ILWU 
man later, that stopped when men in the mill refused to work with “scabs.”240 
The company appealed to the Chamber of Commerce, which set up a fact-
finding commission on the dispute.241 But a representative from the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and another from the CIO managed to get on the 
commission, so the hearing did not produce the company’s desired result.242 
Afterward, said Albright, “public sentiment is more critical of management than 
usual in Juneau.”243 On May 10, the company tried once again to get the men to 
return to work, but only three showed up.244 The day after that, the door to the 
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time clock office was found nailed shut.245 Juneau Spruce had clearly 
underestimated the resolve of the longshoremen. 
Company managers tried another tack. They promised William Flint, an 
ambitious 21-year-old IWA millworker, an opportunity to rise in the company 
if he could get the IWA to break ranks with the ILWU.246 The company sent him 
to Oregon to meet with the leaders of the IWA.247 The strategy worked. On July 
9, 1948, the mill reopened with IWA workers who crossed the picket line and 
loaded a barge.248 Flint, who was elected president of the IWA on the same day 
the IWA members voted to cross the ILWU picket line, accompanied the barge 
to Prince Rupert, British Columbia, to ensure the men at the port would unload 
it.249 Flint had no more success with ILWU men there than he had in Juneau; 
they refused to unload it because the ILWU had put Juneau Spruce on the 
union’s unfair list.250 So the barge continued to Tacoma, Washington, where, 
finally, Flint found AFL men to unload it.251 Tacoma was one of only three 
Pacific Coast ports where longshoremen belonged to the conservative AFL-
affiliated International Longshoremen’s Association rather than the progressive 
ILWU.252 
The company closed the mill for good in October 1948, claiming the 
picketing prevented them from getting the lumber unloaded at ports of delivery 
for months at a time.253 In October 1949, the mill burned down.254 It was not 
rebuilt.255 The historical record does not reveal the cause of the fire, whether the 
property was insured, or whether an insurance claim was paid. Flint’s loyalty 
was rewarded, however; he remained employed by Juneau Spruce after the mill 
was gone.256  
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The story might have ended there, but for the Taft-Hartley Act.  
B. The Taft-Hartley Act Offers a New Tool 
Taft-Hartley provided the tool that the Juneau Spruce company needed to 
combat Local 16’s resistance. Section 8(b)(4) of the Act made it unlawful for a 
union to strike, or to encourage employees to strike, with certain prohibited 
objectives, including to change working conditions of an employer other than 
the employees’ own (known as a secondary strike) or to force an employer to 
assign work to members of one union rather than another (known as a 
jurisdictional strike).257 Juneau Spruce hired a Portland law firm to file an unfair 
labor practice charge under section 8(b)(4) against Local 16 and the 
International.258 Taft-Hartley also added two powerful new remedies to protect 
employers—remedies unavailable to workers—and Juneau Spruce sought both. 
First, the company invoked a provision of the Act that required the NLRB to 
seek an immediate preliminary injunction against any violation of section 
8(b)(4) and required the agency’s lawyers to prioritize seeking such injunctions 
over all other cases.259 What this meant is that when Juneau Spruce filed its 
charge with the Board, the staff in the regional office were required by law to 
immediately investigate the charge and, if they found merit to it, to seek an 
injunction against it.260 The second provision of Taft-Hartley that Juneau Spruce 
invoked was section 303, which allowed any person “injured in his business or 
property by reason of” any violation of section 8(b)(4) to sue for damages in 
federal court.261 This meant that even if the NLRB decided that picketing was 
legally permissible and declined to issue a complaint or seek an injunction, 
Juneau Spruce could still recover damages in federal court. 
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For its defense against the unfair labor practice proceedings before the 
NLRB and the damages suit in federal court, the ILWU turned to their regular 
counsel, a small San Francisco law firm known for representing unpopular 
clients, including labor activists.262 Like other progressive labor lawyers of the 
era, some had come to labor law as a distinct field of practice when it emerged 
in the 1920s from tort and criminal cases dealing with interference with business 
during the World War I-era campaign for civil liberties. They were drawn to 
representation of labor unions because they were socialists or progressives who 
thought law could be an instrument of social change.263 The enactment of the 
New Deal labor legislation, as well as wage, hour, and workers’ compensation 
laws, transformed labor law practice from the defense of outlaws to an 
affirmative project of representing workers demanding enforcement of 
minimum standards and the right to unionize and bargain collectively.264 By 
1947, when the Juneau Spruce litigation arose, an ABA study of the legal 
profession found that “[f]ormerly, unions conducted their own everyday affairs, 
but today lawyers have become necessary not only for momentous issues but 
also for the daily problems of the union.”265 
The trial was handled by George Andersen, a Danish immigrant who had 
dropped out of school after the sixth grade to support his family by working as 
a boilermaker and graduated from the night law school program of the 
University of San Francisco.266 The appellate work was handled principally by 
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Richard Gladstein, who had worked his way through his undergraduate and law 
school education at the University of California at Berkeley and who had been 
passed over for a job at the Alameda County District Attorney’s office because 
of a Jewish quota.267 Gladstein later explained that he chose to represent union 
activists, including accused Communists in various sedition prosecutions, 
because their cases raised “the most important civil liberties issue in America 
today.”268 The junior partner in the firm, Norman Leonard, was the son of Jewish 
immigrants and came to union labor representation fresh from Columbia Law 
School.269 The lawyers were involved in all sorts of progressive labor, civil 
rights, and civil liberties work, including litigation that declared closed shop 
agreements unenforceable if the union excluded Black people from membership; 
they also represented civil rights activists seeking to invalidate an injunction 
against picketing to protest race discrimination by a chain of Bay Area grocery 
stores.270 They faced tremendous hostility for their work. The FBI tapped their 
phones and conducted a long investigation into their alleged subversive 
activities.271 In January 1948, a gunman entered the law office on a Saturday 
morning.272 Finding George Andersen alone at work, the gunman shot Andersen 
and fled.273 Although the police and the press claimed the motive was robbery, 
the lawyers were fairly sure the motive was intimidation.274 
When the Juneau Spruce dispute began, the Taft-Hartley Act was so new 
that its meaning was uncertain, but Andersen and his colleagues worried about 
its implications for the ILWU’s picketing as soon as the law was enacted.275 On 
the lawyers’ advice, the International wired the Local to warn them of the new 
penalties for labor picketing: “Is ILWU and IWA engaged in jurisdictional 
dispute re this sawmill[?] . . . Obligatory upon NLRB to seek injunction against 
such actions. Union subject to damage suits[.]”276  
The lawyers’ fears were justified. Although the first NLRB field agent 
rejected the company’s unfair labor practice charge after investigation, and the 
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NLRB in Washington rejected the company’s appeal,277 the company persisted. 
After the ambitious young Flint got IWA members to cross the ILWU picket 
line, the company convinced the NLRB to issue a complaint on the charge that 
the picketing was an unlawful jurisdictional strike.278  
The company was not content with waiting for the NLRB investigation and 
hearing to decide whether the picketing was lawful, and so in October 1948—a 
year before the agency would award the work to the IWA—the company also 
filed suit under section 303 against both Local 16 and the International.279 
Although the International had no involvement in the dispute other than allowing 
its regional organizer, Vern Albright, to work as Local 16’s sole paid staffer, it 
did have money.280 The theory of liability against the International was that 
Albright had acted on behalf of the International when he helped the Local.281 
The company argued to the jury (and, later, to the court of appeals) that 
Albright’s involvement, along with the International’s having placed Juneau 
Spruce on the union’s unfair list (which prevented the barges from being 
unloaded in Prince Rupert), made it jointly and severally liable for the 
company’s lost profits from April 1948, when the picketing began, until the trial 
commenced.282 
Andersen and Gladstein attacked this theory on several fronts. First, from 
April to July, the IWA agreed with the ILWU that the loading should have been 
done by ILWU workers as had been the past practice.283 Second, they insisted 
the picketing was an entirely permissible protest of the company’s unfair labor 
practice, at least until September 1949, when the NLRB determined that the 
work was legally the province of the mill workers, rather than the 
longshoremen.284 How, they argued, could it be wrong to protest a work 
assignment when the agency charged with deciding such disputes had not acted? 
Finally, from the point of view of the ILWU, the whole thing happened because 
the company refused to respect the decision of both the IWA and the ILWU that 
 
 277 Letter from Germain Bulcke to George R. Andersen (Oct. 27, 1948), supra note 250, at 1–2. 
 278 Id.; Melton Boyd, Hearing Officer, NLRB, to Juneau Spruce Corp. (Sept. 13, 1948) (on file with the 
ILWU archives). 
 279 Juneau Spruce Corp. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 83 F. Supp. 224, 224–25 (D. 
Alaska 1949) (denying motion to dismiss).  
 280 Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 189 F.2d 177, 186 (9th Cir. 
1951). 
 281 Id. at 181. 
 282 Id. at 192. 
 283 Letter from George R. Andersen, Attorney, Gladstein, Andersen, Resner & Sawyer, to Louis Goldblatt, 
ILWU 1 (May 2, 1949) (on file with the ILWU archives). 
 284 Id. at 1–2. 
FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:01 PM 
108 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:63 
the loading on the docks should be done by longshoremen, as it always had 
been.285 All of Juneau Spruce’s damages could have been avoided, the ILWU 
argued at trial (and later to the Senate, urging an amendment to the Taft-Hartley 
Act to remove the legal prohibition of protests like the one in Juneau) if the 
company had honored the two unions’ votes that the work was properly within 
the jurisdiction of the ILWU.286 But the Taft-Hartley Act empowered the 
company to ignore the unions’ resolution and then to sue for the damages that 
the unions’ vote was intended to prevent. Having refused to accept the amicable 
solution to the problem and therefore prompting a strike, according to the ILWU, 
the employer had caused its own problems.287  
The jury accepted the company’s view across the board and awarded 
$750,000 for lost profits.288 While the case made its way through the appeals 
process, Gladstein and Andersen worked furiously to plan for the possibility that 
the judgment would be upheld.289 Among other things, they warned the union 
that the company could collect the judgment through a variety of intrusive 
methods: the company could get a court order allowing it to collect any money 
in any of the International’s bank accounts; it could put a lien on any of the 
union’s real or personal property; it could have the court appoint a receiver to 
take control of the union and to collect any dues paid by any local union to the 
International.290 As it turned out, the company did all of those things. 
The case caused much consternation within the union because the enormous 
damages judgment (worth about $8 million in 2020 dollars) would bankrupt the 
International and destroy the union.291 And the Juneau Spruce judgment was not 
the only financial emergency facing the union. In the same month the Juneau 
Spruce jury returned its verdict, a federal grand jury indicted Harry Bridges for 
lying in his naturalization hearing by saying that he was not a Communist, and 
it also indicted two other ILWU leaders for aiding and abetting his alleged 
lies.292 In addition, the ILWU was in the middle of a huge strike in Hawai’i in 
support of the newly organized sugar and pineapple workers, as well as a 
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warehouse strike on the mainland.293 ILWU leaders were convinced (not without 
reason) that the employers in all these far-flung matters were communicating 
with each other; the situation, they thought, “appears to be an all-out fight by the 
employers to wipe out our union.”294 
Although the lawyers and the union’s leaders worried about the existential 
threat of Taft-Hartley injunctions and damages generally, and the Juneau Spruce 
judgment in particular, they made a strategic decision to approach the case in the 
courts as a narrow and technical matter of an overbroad statutory provision. The 
strategy produced a comparably narrow and technical Supreme Court loss in 
January 1952.295 In a brief, unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court 
rejected the union’s principal argument, which was that employers should not 
recover damages for picketing that had occurred before the NLRB ruled that the 
picketing union was not entitled to the work.296 
C. “The Old Business of Cops and Robbers, Chasing Debtors”  
The high stakes, post-judgment maneuvering to prevent the judgment from 
bankrupting the union became an epic battle of lawyer wits that began before 
the Court ruled and lasted for several years after. As employers in the Pacific 
Northwest combined efforts with employers and lawyers in San Francisco and 
Hawai’i to collect the judgment by seizing ILWU assets wherever they could be 
found, ILWU lawyers became increasingly sure that there was collusion among 
them in an effort to smash the union. Years later, Andersen wrote:  
The Union recognized that not only was the judgment binding upon it, 
but that the efforts to procure the judgment as well as to satisfy it, were 
inspired not only by the terms and provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
but there were political overtones and desirable political ends being 
sought by Juneau Spruce and unknown others believed to be in concert 
with them and to whom the harassment or liquidation of the Union 
would be of inestimable value as well as satisfaction.297 
The ILWU prided itself on being thriftier than other big unions of the era. 
Bridges and other ILWU staff and officers famously took as pay no more than 
the highest earning member working on the docks,298 and the per capita 
payments that local unions gave to the International (a portion of each member’s 
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dues) were relatively low.299 As a consequence, the lawyers for Juneau Spruce 
were going to have a difficult time collecting the judgment. But they went after 
it with zeal. 
Juneau Spruce hired lawyers in San Francisco and Hawai’i to secure the 
appointment of a receiver to take over the financial affairs of the union and find 
the bank accounts, buildings, and any money belonging to the International. 
Having seen this coming, the International had made certain that it had no money 
in the bank.300 As ILWU Vice President Lou Goldblatt recalled, “When they 
tried to attach a bank account we had, all they picked up was an overdraft.”301 It 
was, he said, “the old business of cops and robbers, chasing debtors,” as the 
lawyers for the company battled the lawyers for the union to see who could 
outsmart or outlast whom.302 To reduce its assets, the union paid its staff and 
vendors six months in advance.303 Still, the company “levied upon every 
conceivable bank account in which it could be asserted that the ILWU had an 
interest.”304 The company’s lawyers tried to seize and sell the ILWU’s San 
Francisco headquarters building, only to discover that the union’s lawyers had 
already arranged for it to be sold to a nonprofit organization, with the sale 
financed by a large mortgage.305 
As the lawyers for Juneau Spruce got ever more frustrated in their efforts to 
collect from the International, they decided to go after other ILWU locals—
independent legal entities with no involvement in the dispute—on the theory that 
some of the money in their hands could be regarded as the International’s assets 
(because of ILWU bylaws obligating locals to pay a portion of their dues to the 
International).306 Attacking the locals was also a way to get leverage to force the 
International to settle. The company’s lawyers were right, ultimately, that this 
tactic would work, but it took longer than they thought.307 The ILWU and its 
lawyers had spent twenty years battling intransigent employers, violent police, 
the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), the AFL, the CIO, the 
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FBI, the DOJ, and many others over wages, working conditions, communism, 
and efforts to deport Harry Bridges.308 Richard Gladstein even spent six months 
in federal prison for contempt of court in connection with his representation of 
eleven leftist labor and civil rights activists tried for violating the Smith Act, 
which prohibited teaching about communism.309 They were used to bare-
knuckle legal fights and this one was just the latest in a long series. Nevertheless, 
not every leader of every local was quite so experienced with legal struggles, 
and the International needed to help the leaders of the locals withstand the 
onslaught of legal proceedings. And the legal proceedings frequently froze 
locals’ accounts whether or not the International had any assets there, which 
prevented local unions from paying their staff.  
The company tried to weaken the resolve of ILWU members by using debt 
collection mechanisms to gather information on them and the activities and 
finances of all the local unions.310 Company lawyers subpoenaed all sorts of 
information about the International’s strategy and operations beyond its 
assets.311 A 1955 subpoena, for example, sought all Executive Board minutes 
and “all journals, ledgers, records, and books of account” from 1948 onward, 
and the names, locations, and membership information of every ILWU local.312 
Membership information, the ILWU protested, was not public information. Still, 
union lawyers were not confident they could win litigation to protect this 
information, because in the early 1950s, at the height of the HUAC hearings, the 
FBI, HUAC, and their sympathizers in the business community were seeking 
union membership records all over the country. Union lawyers feared that 
compliance with one of these subpoenas would leave union members at risk of 
blacklisting.313  
The International fought back against the appointment of receivers by 
sending a memo to all locals explaining that freezing the assets of the 
International meant that there were no assets to pay the various committees and 
area arbitrators that resolved disputes in any Pacific port where ILWU members 
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worked.314 This was a signal to employers that if the union’s assets were frozen, 
the dispute resolution mechanisms on which employers relied to handle quickie 
strikes on the docks would also stop. The memo also reminded the locals of a 
provision in the ILWU contracts stating that in the event of outside interference 
in the union, the contract—and its no-strike clause—was void.315 Just as the 
Juneau Spruce Company thought it could use the judgment to bust the 
International by breaking down the solidarity of the locals, the ILWU reminded 
all the other employers that they had something to lose in the Juneau Spruce 
company’s effort to expand the scope of the dispute.316 
The union’s situation became desperate when lawyers for Juneau Spruce 
filed a suit in federal court in Hawai’i, seeking authority to seize the assets of 
Local 142, a huge local that included tens of thousands of sugar and pineapple 
plantation workers who had only recently—after epic struggles and major 
strikes—joined the ILWU and won collective bargaining agreements.317 To 
defuse this strategy, the ILWU had recently changed the union by-laws to make 
per capita contributions from locals entirely voluntary.318 That way, the 
company could not argue that the assets of the locals were anything to which the 
International had a claim and, therefore, the assets of the locals should not be 
subject to freezing and seizure. But the Juneau Spruce lawyers had a response 
for that: the new “voluntary” per capita rule was a sham. The federal court agreed 
and issued an order freezing the assets of the Hawai’i local.319 
To protect its members’ hard-earned dues money, Local 142 simply stopped 
depositing dues in the bank.320 The union that was famously scrupulous with its 
finances was suddenly forced to start acting like the long-derided East Coast and 
Gulf Coast International Longshore Association, running its operation out of 
bags of cash.321 Yet the ILWU described their activities in these years the way 
Hollywood portrayed the French Resistance to the Nazis322—it was all in service 
of a noble cause. Not to mention, it was kind of fun to outwit their adversary. 
For example, Lou Goldblatt recalled that in 1955, when the International needed 
money, he asked lawyer George Andersen—who was going to Hawai’i to work 
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on the case—to bring back some cash. Andersen returned from the islands with 
$60,000 in cash.323 Not wanting to keep it on hand, Andersen delivered the 
money to Goldblatt at his home on a Friday evening.324 Goldblatt responded, 
“What the devil do I want it for? I can’t go down to the bank and put it in the 
safety deposit box.”325 Andersen replied, “Well, you asked me to go bring it and 
I’m not going to keep it.”326 So, according to Goldblatt, “the money hung around 
all weekend and I figured the best thing to do was to put it in the most prominent 
place of all, so I just left the thing in a cigar box on the mantelpiece.”327 On 
Monday, with the help of a friendly bank teller willing to work after hours, 
Goldblatt converted it into cashier’s checks.328 
I’d give him a list of bills I wanted paid – salaries, or other expenses; 
everything we could prepay, and give him the exact amounts. He 
would make out cashier’s checks. He’d call me just as the bank was 
closing and I’d go there and knock; he’d open up because he was 
expecting me and I’d give him the cash, pick up the cashier’s checks 
and have them all mailed within a half hour.329  
When the Juneau Spruce lawyers figured this out, they informed Judge 
McLaughlin in Hawai’i and asked him to hold the ILWU’s Hawai’i lawyer, 
Myer Symonds, in contempt for violating the asset freezing order.330 Symonds 
insisted that any knowledge he had of the transaction was protected by attorney-
client privilege, and Judge McLaughlin felt compelled to agree.331 But he did 
refer Symonds to the Hawai’i Bar Association for discipline and also to the U.S. 
Attorney for prosecution.332 The Bar ultimately determined that attorney-client 
privilege had prevented Symonds from disclosing what his client did and, 
therefore, he should not be disciplined, and evidently the U.S. Attorney 
agreed.333 The judge therefore declined to hold him in contempt.334 
As in San Francisco, the company’s lawyers tried to seize Local 142’s 
headquarters building in Honolulu, only to discover they had been outfoxed and 
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the union had already sold it to a nonprofit.335 There was litigation over whether 
the sale was a sham, but ultimately, all the company got from the headquarters 
was the value of some furniture and four typewriters.336 Yet, with its assets 
frozen and no end to the litigation in sight, in January 1955, Local 142 in 
Honolulu (with 23,000 members) decided the only solution was to disaffiliate 
with the ILWU, effective immediately.337  
Worried that the litigation would wipe out a decade of organizing, ILWU 
leaders decided some settlement had to be made. Suspecting that the Juneau 
Spruce company was tiring of paying its lawyers to recover nothing, Lou 
Goldblatt thought he saw an opening. The union would settle the case for 
$68,000 in funds left over from the Harry Bridges legal defense fund.338 When 
the company refused to accept their lawyers’ advice to take that deal, ILWU 
lawyers landed on another idea. 
A few years before, as part of the Hawai’i organizing campaign, ILWU 
lawyers had filed a number of collective action suits on behalf of plantation 
workers for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).339 One 
was a test case on behalf of hundreds of cane processing workers.340 The workers 
had won at trial, although the amount of their recovery would have to be proved 
in individual proceedings.341 Then, the Ninth Circuit overturned the judgment in 
its entirety, finding the workers exempt from the FLSA.342 In the March 1955 
Supreme Court argument, the tenor of the questions made it seem that the 
justices were divided.343 Rather than risk a potentially significant backpay 
award, lawyers for the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) offered to 
settle the case for $250,000.344 Suddenly the ILWU’s members were going to 
have a pile of money. The lawyers, together with ILWU regional director Jack 
Hall, local president Jack Kawano, and local leader Freddie Kamahoahoa, 
debated whether they should settle the Juneau Spruce case with the Waialua 
settlement.345 On the one hand, they would be depriving Hawai’ian workers of 
a significant sum of money to pay for picketing that they had had nothing to do 
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with. But, on the other, the local leaders also thought that trying to divide up the 
recovery would be difficult and could undermine solidarity. As Jack Hall said to 
Lou Goldblatt, “Trying to undertake the distribution of $250,000 to whatever 
number of guys we had in sugar at the time, 18,000 or 20,000 members, would 
be a hopeless job. Some people would get 10 bucks, some people would get 
nothing, and it would be more divisive than it’s worth.”346 Moreover, Local 142 
had negotiated better protections in a collective agreement in the nine years since 
the suit was filed, so the backpay award seemed like ancient history. Thus, even 
if the workers won in the Supreme Court, it was not obvious that the legal win 
would be a victory from the standpoint of building worker power. 
The union took the matter to the workers. Local leaders went from plantation 
to plantation and met with all of the roughly 10,000 plaintiffs to explain the 
situation. Fewer than half a dozen workers at the 26 affected plantations refused 
to approve the settlement and relinquish any claim to the money.347 The ILWU 
lawyers settled the sugar case and immediately turned around and settled the 
Juneau Spruce case for $250,000.348 On May 23, 1955, just a couple of weeks 
after the settlements were negotiated, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in the Waialua case: the workers were unprotected by FLSA and lost 
everything.349 “The HSPA money [was] used to pay Juneau Spruce and it 
doesn’t cost the union a goddam nickel!” gloated Goldblatt.350 “Everybody in 
the Islands had a big laugh that the Big Five had been taken for a ride; settled 
for $250,000 bucks when it wouldn’t have cost them a goddam dime.”351 
When the news reported the whole situation, the Honolulu press, which was 
a reliable voice for the interests of business, framed the settlement as union 
duplicity. Under the headline, It’s the Hawaii Workers Who Pay, the Honolulu 
Star Bulletin editorialized, “[t]he damage was done by the I.L.W.U. in Alaska 
but it’s the rank-and-file in Hawaii that gets soaked for it!”352 But, the editorial 
concluded, “[a]ctually, when the chips are finally distributed, it turns out that the 
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lawyers got a lot of the money anyway.”353 This was the one thing the union and 
the newspapers could agree on: nobody got any money out of the whole 
miserable episode except the company’s lawyers, whose fees consumed the 
$250,000 settlement.354  
Given how little the Juneau Spruce Company or the Hawai’ian Big Five got 
out of the litigation, it is important to bear in mind how much they might have 
gotten, and the significance of the Taft-Hartley Act in changing the Pacific Coast 
employers’ labor and legal strategy. In the mid-1940s, some shipping and 
longshoring companies (at least in San Francisco) seemed to have accepted 
unionization and even Harry Bridges, although they persisted in accusing him 
of being a Communist.355 All Pacific Coast employers (except in three cities, 
including Tacoma, Washington) were parties to the industry-wide collective 
agreement with the ILWU, although local unions handled minor disputes locally 
with each employer,356 as in the case of Local 16 in Juneau.357 Since 1936, many 
contract terms had been imposed, and all disputes had been resolved, through 
arbitration, which had occurred under the auspices of the Secretary of Labor and 
by the National War Labor Board between 1942 and 1945.358 By the spring of 
1947, respected labor economist Clark Kerr reported that the major sources of 
disagreement between the Waterfront Employers’ Association of the Pacific 
Coast and the ILWU were the pace of work and stopping periodic local work 
stoppages.359 Another major disagreement, according to Kerr, concerned the 
hiring hall, which was supported by employers.360 The union thought it should 
use a rotation system to share work equitably among the whole labor force, but 
employers favored a gang system, which would allow employers to request the 
same gang of workers for job after job.361 Importantly, Kerr said, the employers 
had largely resigned themselves to working with the ILWU.362 Indeed, the 
President of the American-Hawaii Shipping Company said that by the mid-
1940s he had come to the view that although he thought Bridges was a 
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Communist, he did not favor deporting him, and he believed the waterfront 
employers could and should work with him and with the ILWU.363  
But the Taft-Hartley Act offered an opportunity to unsettle the status quo. 
As James Rogers, the lawyer for Juneau Spruce, gloated in a meeting of the 
Portland, Oregon, Chamber of Commerce, it provided a way to smash the 
ILWU, and he and the Big Five seized it.364 
D. Union Lawyer Oversight of Worker Direct Action 
Although many activist union leaders like those at the ILWU refused to 
concede that the Taft-Hartley Act would force them into quiescence, the 
aftermath of the Juneau Spruce verdict shows the ways in which the ILWU’s 
erstwhile radical leaders and lawyers came to monitor and discourage rank-and-
file activism, in order to ensure the union’s continued survival. 
As for the leaders, at the first ILWU Executive Board meeting after the 
Juneau Spruce verdict, one board member asked how on earth the International 
got tangled up in such a mess.365 The leadership’s lengthy and defensive reply 
suggested that Local 16 tried to avoid a strike and that the International was 
careful about supporting local union protests.366 As ILWU Vice President 
Goldblatt recalled, the “five or six very intensive years” after the enactment of 
the Taft-Hartley Act were “an extremely difficult and arduous period in the life 
of the ILWU. Things piled up on us very quickly.”367 Unlike many other radical 
unions, the ILWU retained most of its membership. But its successes in 
organizing new and smaller places in Chicago, New Orleans, and Minneapolis 
were reversed because “there was no way of hanging on to them during this 
era.”368 Employers provoked strikes, knowing they had the remedies of the Taft-
Hartley Act as a tool, and Juneau Spruce was one spectacularly hard-fought 
example. “For a period you couldn’t help but feel every morning that the circle 
was getting tighter around you; an attack on every flank . . . . We were literally 
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fighting for survival.”369 The union weathered it all, said Goldblatt, because of 
“the tradition of militancy, a deep loyalty on the part of the membership and a 
willingness to struggle instead of backing away from these beefs.”370  
But it took its toll. Leaders at both the International and some locals 
apparently became cautious about resorting to picketing when companies 
refused to comply with ILWU collective agreements and also became more 
inclined to seek legal advice before acting. Two weeks after the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Juneau Spruce, the Company gave notice of its 
intent to terminate its contracts with the ILWU before they expired and to use 
ILWU men for fewer jobs than it had done before.371 The leaders of Local 16 
believed this new “BEEF,” as they called it, was copying “the pattern laid by” 
Juneau Spruce and was not authorized by the ILWU’s master agreement with 
Alaskan employers.372 But rather than act, they promptly wrote to the 
International leadership asking for assistance, noting that “this matter may 
require Legal-Talent to keep us out of another [costly] Encounter” and the local 
needed to “be able to put ourselves on firm ground when and where we have to 
negotiate with this Company and its LAWYERS.”373  
The effect on the lawyers is even clearer, and more multifaceted. First, the 
case prompted union lawyer review of the ILWU’s newspaper, The 
Dispatcher.374 The judgment against the International was based, in part, on The 
Dispatcher’s coverage of the picketing at the mill; the paper’s publication of the 
company being on the unfair list had prompted ILWU members to refuse to 
unload the barges in Prince Rupert, British Columbia.375 Unnerved by the 
prospect that company lawyers would read The Dispatcher as ratifying illegal 
local conduct, Goldblatt fired off a terse memo to the staff of The Dispatcher 
and the union’s publicity department instructing them that henceforward, “all 
articles or editorials on Juneau Spruce which are written for the Dispatcher, must 
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be checked with Allan Brotsky, in Gladstein’s office before publication.”376 For 
Brotsky, who was devoted to the cause of civil liberties, censoring the newspaper 
to protect the union’s legal position must have been a dreary task. To be sure, 
the paper remained a lively voice of criticism of the Juneau Spruce decision; the 
editor devoted half an issue to the Supreme Court’s ruling with stories and 
cartoons condemning it as a “new strikebreaking gimmick”377 that would allow 
the national CIO, which “has been trying to destroy us for years,” and “courts 
just as eager as [the] CIO,” to “smash militant, autonomous unions.”378 Still, it 
is impossible to know the path not taken here—how the birth of attorney review 
of union communications altered the course of what might have been said. 
In addition to censoring The Dispatcher, the union’s attorneys also took on 
a more prominent role in evaluating proposed picketing, strikes, and boycotts 
for possible damages liability. In January 1951, while Juneau Spruce was on 
appeal, Allan Brotsky wrote to an organizer for the International, cautioning him 
about getting involved in local disputes.379 Similarly, when Local 16 sought 
advice about a “new beef,” Brotsky cautioned: 
[E]ven though the Company may be breaching its agreement with 
Local 16 by diverting work now done by longshoremen . . . the Local 
has no right to picket the Company to prevent them from doing 
that . . . . Fantastic as this may seem, this is precisely what the Taft-
Hartley [Act] provides as that law has now been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”380  
And so, Brotsky concluded, picketing to enforce the contract “would subject 
the Local (and undoubtedly the International, . . . ), to law suits for damages.”381 
Brotsky took this stance even though the facts of the Juneau Lumber dispute 
were arguably distinguishable from the Juneau Spruce case; the loss had made 
him risk averse.  
Allan Brotsky also instructed Lincoln Fairley, the ILWU Research Director, 
that the Juneau Spruce verdict had come about because “the International 
Representative in question” had not “understood the problems raised by the 
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Taft[-]Hartley Act”382 and had failed to clarify that he was acting only on behalf 
of the Local, not the International.383 Fairley then drafted a memo to all locals 
explaining that “the beefs which lead to damage suits are ordinarily beefs in 
which individual locals become involved . . . . The International has no authority 
to start the beef, to participate in it, to direct it, to encourage it or to assist it by 
financial means.”384 Fairley was forced to explain that “[t]he consequence of 
these provisions of [the Taft-Hartley] Act is that union officials and 
representatives need to watch their step so as not to involve the International in 
any situation which is likely to result in damages suits[.]”385 The courts and the 
NLRB would consider International staff as agents of locals for purposes of Taft-
Hartley Act liability “unless they take affirmative steps to make it clear that they 
are not, in fact, acting in that capacity.”386 This was a delicate task. Even 
providing staff with the advice that the lawyer recommended was fraught, as 
Fairley warned: “You will bear in mind, I am sure, the possible use which an 
employer or court could make of the letter if it fell into their hands.”387 
The threat was quite real, as lawyers for labor and management both saw the 
Juneau Spruce case as an effort to break the union that nearly succeeded. Only 
a couple of months before settling the litigation, James Rogers, one of Juneau 
Spruce’s lead attorneys, said in a speech to the Manufacturers Committee of the 
Chamber of Commerce that the judgment would empower the ILWU’s rival, the 
more conservative and quiescent Sailors Union of the Pacific, and it would be a 
“fight to the finish” for the ILWU.388 The ILWU, Rogers crowed, might have to 
disband.389 
Even years later, the ILWU remained cautious about the prospect of liability 
for activism, even as it remained committed to supporting direct action by 
workers on a movement-wide basis. The ILWU and its California locals 
supported the efforts of California farmworkers to organize during the grape 
boycott of the 1960s. For a brief period, ILWU members honored a picket set 
up by farmworkers at the ports of San Francisco and Oakland to protest the 
 
 382 Letter from Allan Brotsky to Lincoln Fairley (Jan. 12, 1951), supra note 379, at 1–2. 
 383 Id. 
 384 Letter from Lincoln Fairley, Rsch. Dir., ILWU, to Allan Brotsky, Attorney, Gladstein, Andersen, 
Resner & Leonard 3 (Feb. 5, 1951) (on file with the ILWU archives) (enclosing draft memorandum to Field 
Staff). 
 385 Id. 
 386 Id. 
 387 Id. 
 388 Fight to Finish Seen for ILWU, COOS BAY TIMES, Mar. 11, 1955. 
 389 Id. 
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shipment of struck grapes.390 But the ILWU and the United Farm Workers 
(UFW) both paid damages for this secondary boycott.391 When the ILWU local 
president—James Herman—agreed to help the farmworkers, he warned that 
they would only be able to get away with picketing for a short time and that the 
UFW members should tell no one that Herman had helped.392 Even fifty years 
after the Supreme Court’s Juneau Spruce ruling, members and staff attending a 
2002 ILWU leadership conference were still being instructed about what the 
case held and the threats that Taft-Hartley restrictions pose for union activism.393  
The risks remain very real. As we noted at the beginning, in November 2019, 
the ILWU was once again subject to a huge damages verdict under section 303 
when members of its Portland, Oregon local engaged in a campaign of protest 
activity—including a slowdown, though not a strike—to protest the refusal to 
recognize that certain work was within the jurisdiction of the ILWU.394 The 
plaintiff, a subsidiary of a Philippine multinational corporation, claimed that it 
had suffered almost $94 million in lost profits and other damages and had been 
forced to withdraw from its contract with the Port of Portland to operate a port 
terminal.395 ICTSI sued the union on an array of theories, including for alleged 
antitrust violations and for unlawful secondary boycotts.396 A jury apparently 
agreed and split the $94 million in damages between the International and its 
local.397 The resemblance to Juneau Spruce is startling, including in the union’s 
delicate balance in how to react publicly to the threat that the judgment will 
smash the union.398 Although local and national news reports covered the 
case,399 the union said nothing. According to one journalist covering the matter, 
the union’s lawyers feared that allowing their client to speak to the press would 
anger the judge, a risk they could not afford to take while their motion to reduce 
or set aside the verdict was on his desk.400 Many social movement organizations 
faced with such a crushing blow would use “name, blame, shame” protests and 
 
 390 GANZ, supra note 24, at 140. 
 391 Id. at 140–41 
 392 Id. 
 393 See Conference Background Information, ILWU LEAD Institute, Unity & Autonomy: The Juneau 
Spruce Case (Sept. 15–19, 2002) (on file with authors). 
 394 ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (D. Or. 2020). For 
additional history of the dispute, see also Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (2015); 
Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (2012). 
 395 Id. 
 396 See, e.g., ICTSI v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 863 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 397 ICTSI Oregon, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1337. 
 398 Compare Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 240 
(1952), with ICTSI Oregon, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1329. 
 399 Baker, supra note 2. 
 400 This was said in a telephone interview, on background, with Catherine Fisk in November 2019.  
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mass mobilization to show they speak for the people, against the power of 
business and government. But the union, at its lawyers’ behest, sits quietly in 
the hope that the judge will spare the union from disaster.401 
III. BRINGING LABOR BACK INTO LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS STUDIES  
The Juneau Spruce saga was much discussed in the labor press at the time, 
and it remains part of the ILWU’s historiography and collective identity.402 Yet, 
in the law and social movements literature, what this case exemplifies about 
labor’s experience with law and, in turn, the multifaceted relationship between 
law and social movements are largely unexplored. 
In this Part, we begin with an analysis of how labor’s experience with law 
complicates the dimensions of law and social movements scholarship identified 
in Part I.C. We then turn to broader theorizing about the relationship between 
law and social movements. We conclude with some thoughts on the future of 
labor as a social movement. 
A. Seeing Social Movements Through the Lens of Labor 
 Seeing social movements through the lens of labor complicates all five of 
the dimensions of the law and social movements literature discussed in Part I. 
1. How Law Channels Movements  
Perhaps the most important benefit of bringing labor back into law and social 
movements studies is that it challenges how we understand the conjunctive 
metaphor that links law to social movements. Labor’s experience shifts the 
emphasis away from “legal mobilization”—how movements strategically use 
law—and from demosprudence—how movements make and change law.403 
These theories see social movements as the subject, and law as the object. The 
ILWU’s experience of the law in the Juneau Spruce case is distinct, however. It 
 
 401 The judge did not spare the union from disaster, but did allow ICTSI to choose remittitur, reducing the 
verdict to $19 million, and alternatively ordering a new trial on damages. ICTSI Oregon, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 
1366; see Bernstein, supra note 6. But $19 million is still more than twice the total assets of the union. The 
employer refused to accept the remittitur, and the matter is now before the trial judge on the union’s motion for 
interlocutory appeal. See ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, No. 3:12-cv-1058-SI, 2020 
WL 2768683, at *1 (D. Or. May 28, 2020). 
 402 See ZALBURG, supra note 209, at 382–88. 
 403 See supra Part I.C.1. 
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is not about how social movements act upon law, but rather about how law acts 
upon social movements. 
Labor’s experience with law in the Juneau Spruce matter is largely about 
law being used to regulate movement activity—a form of what other scholars 
have referred to as “channeling.”404 In their theorization of how law channels 
social movements, John McCarthy and his co-authors argue that even seemingly 
mundane forms of regulation, such as tax law and postal service rules, affect 
social movement behavior through “a tangle of incentives favoring certain 
standard forms of organization, tactical approaches, and collective goals.”405 
These, they argue, promote “voluntary” compliance with state-desired ends.406 
Labor’s experience highlights that channeling can fundamentally reshape a 
movement, regardless of whether the movement proactively invokes legal tools. 
Labor scholars have long shown how government regulation of unions 
creates a tangle of incentives toward less radical, less political, more self-
interested behavior.407 The Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts reduced outright 
repression of labor as a social movement, but they channeled union activism 
towards a state-preferred goal—collective bargaining—and away from more 
radical movement objectives, including broad-based organizing aimed at 
exerting working-class power.408 And, as Christopher Tomlins pointed out, the 
Wagner Act changed the structure under which unions organized by requiring 
them to adhere to the NLRB’s determination of what constituted an appropriate 
 
 404 The term “channeling” has been used with different meanings by different scholars in the literature. 
Generally, it suggests the ways in which law can orient movement activity down a particular path, from which 
various institutional constraints make it difficult to deviate. Law channels social movements during litigation 
campaigns seeking to expand rights of minorities; once a movement proactively engages with law, that 
engagement alters the movement’s trajectory, including even its protest activity, to focus on the rights seeking 
to be established in litigation. Leachman, supra note 125, at 1737–49. Similarly, Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s study 
of movement mobilization in defense of affirmative action reveals that “social movements that define themselves 
through law risk undermining their insurgent role in the political process, and thus undermining their agenda-
setting ability.” Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1436 
(2005). 
 405 John D. McCarthy, David W. Britt & Mark Wolfson, The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements 
by the State in the United States, 13 RSCH. SOC. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS & CHANGE 45 (1991). 
 406 Id. at 49. 
 407 See FORBATH, supra note 24; MCCANN, supra note 24; Rogers, supra note 25.  
 408 The focus on legal mobilization rather than on organizing is one of the chief criticisms of contemporary 
social movements, and it is made especially forcefully by labor scholars, and by few so forcefully as Jane 
McAlevey. See Eleni Schirmer, Jane McAlevey’s Vision for the Future of American Labor, NEW YORKER 
(June 10, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/jane-mcaleveys-vision-for-the-future-of-
american-labor. McAlevey points out that law played an outsize role in directing union power away from broad-
based organizing and direct action, toward weaker forms of action which left managerial power untouched. JANE 
MCALEVEY, A COLLECTIVE BARGAIN: UNIONS, ORGANIZING, AND THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY 58–61 (2020). 
FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:01 PM 
124 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:63 
bargaining unit, rather than what the union considered best for its organizational 
objectives and worker interests.409 Judicial interpretations of the NLRA, as well 
as the legislative changes wrought by Taft-Hartley, increased the costs of certain 
movement tactics—such as the sit-down strike that had been crucial to 
organizing Detroit in 1937,410 slowdowns by workers who feared an all-out 
strike,411 wildcat strikes,412 or the picketing at Juneau Spruce. Courts, and to a 
lesser extent the NLRB, imported pre-NLRA notions from master-servant law 
into the new labor law in ways that constrained the rights of workers to act 
collectively.413 Law accordingly channeled worker militance into periodic 
strikes in support of enterprise-based collective bargaining and rewarded unions 
that honored no-strike clauses. 
The Juneau Spruce episode also reveals the processes by which channeling 
occurs, even as labor movement actors—including their lawyers—consciously 
attempt to resist it. The ILWU had long been a union which bucked bureaucratic 
conservatism in favor of more radical, direct action.414 In 1952, that choice 
almost bankrupted the union. The ILWU’s attorneys were deeply committed to 
rank-and-file leadership; yet, they had to reckon with how important their legal 
knowledge, and legal prudence, could be to the institutions they served. Lawyers 
started reviewing the union newspaper for unnecessarily risky statements.415 
They warned leaders about involving the International in local disputes.416 And 
when faced with the prospect of a new “beef” several years later, one that looked 
unsettlingly like the Juneau Spruce case, the lawyers favored a more 
conservative approach and cautioned against picketing.417 
The effect (intentional or not) of the employers’ use of the restrictive law 
regulating unions was not just to channel labor activity into weaker and less 
 
 409 Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in Historical Perspective, 65 J. 
AM. HIST. 1021, 1041 (1979). 
 410 James Gray Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial 
Relations, 1935-1948, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45, 74–82 (2006). 
 411 James Atleson, Elk Lumber, Slowdowns, and the Suppression of Worker Solidarity (1950), in 
AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES AND LAW HISTORIES (Kenneth M. Casebeer ed., 2d ed. 2017).  
 412 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 263 (1939) (overturning an NLRB order that 
peaceful sit-down strikers were entitled to reinstatement at conclusion of strike); James Gray Pope, How 
American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 533–34 (2004). 
 413 JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); STUART CHINN, 
RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL CHANGE 109–51 (2014). 
 414 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 208. 
 415 See supra text accompanying note 376. 
 416 See supra text accompanying note 380. 
 417 See supra text accompanying note 381. 
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disruptive activities, but also, importantly, to conscript unwilling union lawyers 
in blunting union activism. 
While labor is unique among social movements in the extent to which it has 
been subject to nationwide and movement-specific regulation, law plays a 
structuring role in all movements; it constitutes the terrain on which movements 
and counter-movements engage in strategic action. One example of how 
background legal rules were employed in an attempt to regulate civil rights 
movement organizations—and to leverage their specific institutional structure 
against them—is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, decided in 1958.418 At 
that time, the NAACP drew much of its funding, as well as its legitimacy, from 
its membership base. Alabama tried to employ state corporation laws to drive 
the NAACP out of the state, and in the course of that litigation, subpoenaed the 
organization’s membership list.419 Given the extreme hostility in the state to the 
movement, and opponents’ willingness to violently attack supporters, had the 
state been successful in asserting a right to membership lists, it could have 
fundamentally altered how the organization functioned. In that case, however, 
the Supreme Court concluded that freedom of association trumped the normal 
operation of civil discovery—and thereby helped preserve the civil rights 
movement as we know it.420 
The trajectory of other movements has similarly been altered by the 
operation of law. As scholars have noted,421 the decision of LGBTQ activists 
and lawyers to focus on marriage equality was a product of many factors, but 
among them were the legal repression of gay sociability in bars and bath 
houses.422 The HIV/AIDS epidemic enabled cities to portray gay sexual 
liberation as a public health danger and to use local government power to shut 
down sexually oriented businesses. This legal change fundamentally altered the 
shape of the movement—not just the contexts in which people would gather, but 
what they were able to imagine.423  
 
 418 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The authors thank Nelson Lichtenstein for this insight. 
 419 Id. at 458–59. 
 420 Id. at 467. 
 421 Cf. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE xx (2013) (noting that although the gay rights movement in the 1970s and 
1980s made progress on other issues, marriage equality was “of little interest to most gay activists” until about 
1990 when, “partly because of the AIDS epidemic, the issue of legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
became more salient to the public and more important to gay activists”). 
 422 Id. 
 423 Indeed, one scholar has argued that after the gay rights movement had successfully challenged police 
harassment of gay bars with predominantly white, middle-class patrons, the movement largely lost interest in 
criminal justice, with devastating consequences for the growth of the carceral state and the fate of gay people of 
color. Timothy Stewart-Winter, Queer Law and Order: Sex, Criminality, and Policing in the Late Twentieth-
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Law and social movements literature has understandably focused on how 
movements use law. But how law also represses, restricts, constrains, and 
channels all movements must equally be part of the story. 
2. When Movements Are Institutions with Something to Lose 
The literature on law and social movements, and on social movements 
generally, has struggled to make sense of the dividing line between social 
movements and institutions.424 Labor’s experience contributes to theorization of 
the costs and benefits of varying levels of institutionalization, and how 
institutionalization mediates the relationship between social movements and 
law.  
Unions became institutions because they saw it as a path to building worker 
power.425 For example, in the 1930s, the ILWU eliminated the day labor market 
at every port—the “shape-up,” with all the discrimination, blacklisting, bribery, 
daily humiliations, and arbitrariness of employers picking who would get work 
each day.426 In its place, the union created hiring halls to distribute work fairly 
to all longshoremen who abided by union rules.427 The ILWU, like every other 
union, hired staff to organize and to research employers and industries to 
improve their bargaining position.428 And unions created health and welfare and 
retirement funds, to improve their members’ lives, and to grow the union.429 
Unions created these and other institutions so that workers could exert control 
over their work lives and economic well-being, rather than submitting to 
whatever policies employers or the state might impose.  
When employers recognized unions, they began to rely on the unions as 
institutions to perform an array of economic and social welfare functions.430 
 
Century United States, 102 J. AM. HIST. 61, 62 (2015). 
 424 See supra Part I. 
 425 Cynthia Estlund has described labor unions’ dual character—which we conceptualize here as an 
institutionalized social movement—in distinct, although not inconsistent, terms. She considers labor unions as a 
particular species of “private entities with public regulatory functions.” Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a 
Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 U. MICH. L. REV. 169, 169 (2015). 
 426 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 208, at 8 (collecting oral histories of ILWU’s founding in the Bay Area, 
including examples of corruption and favoritism that hiring hall eliminated). 
 427 See id. 
 428 See id. at 33. 
 429 See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the 
Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER (Steve Fraser 
& Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (describing growth of union bargaining over benefit plans in the postwar period). 
 430 See generally JACOB HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (describing the development of publicly subsidized 
and regulated, but privately provided, health and retirement benefits and other forms of social insurance). 
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They also relied on unions to be “responsible” by enforcing the collective 
bargaining agreements they negotiated.431 This concept of “responsible 
unionism”—that unions should abide by no-strike clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements and, more generally, refrain from radical activism that 
disrupts the smooth and profitable functioning of business—had its origins in 
political debates over the propriety of damages judgments against unions for the 
epic strikes in mines, factories, and railroads in the Gilded Age.432 When the 
Taft-Hartley Act made unions entities (like corporations) that could be sued 
apart from their members, and thus liable to suit in federal court for breach of 
collective bargaining agreements433 and violation of strike prohibitions, it 
achieved employers’ long-sought goal of law being a tool in requiring 
“responsible unionism.” 
Juneau Spruce confirmed union leaders’ worst fears about the dangers of 
being liable for damages. What looked to the members of Local 16 as a perfectly 
ordinary picket line protesting the company’s unfair labor practice and breach 
of contract looked to a jury as the International’s illegal jurisdictional strike.434 
And, in calculating damages, what union members thought was a laudable 
exercise of labor solidarity among ILWU and IWA members looked to the court 
like a concerted effort to ruin a business.435  
In the fight to resist judgment collection, the union tried to transform the 
constraint of “responsible unionism” into a source of strength. In particular, it 
sought to portray the threat to its resources as leverage.436 By reminding the 
employer association that the system for arbitrating workplace disputes would 
come to a halt if the union could no longer pay for arbitrators, union leaders were 
also reminding them that, absent arbitration, grievances would prompt walk-
outs, and walk-outs would slow down the handling of cargo, leave ships tied up 
at the docks, and ultimately, cost the shippers more than it would cost the striking 
workers. 
 
 431 RUTH O’BRIEN, WORKERS’ PARADOX: THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF NEW DEAL LABOR POLICY, 1886–
1935, at 39–41, 51–56 (1998) (tracing the history of the concept of responsible unionism to debates over railroad 
strikes and whether unions are liable as entities for strikes and boycotts undertaken by their members). 
 432 Id. 
 433 Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act provided that a labor organization “shall be bound by the acts 
of its agents” and “may sue or be sued as an entity.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(b). It protected against the worst abuses by 
saying that “[a]ny money judgment against a labor organization . . . shall be enforceable only against the 
organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or 
his assets.” Id.  
 434 Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 240 (1952). 
 435 Id. 
 436 See supra text accompanying notes 432–35. 
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Juneau Spruce illustrates that legal regulation of the labor movement has 
worked so well precisely because unions are institutions. A massive damages 
judgment is not as grave a threat to a group with no assets because the judgment 
cannot be collected. And if it cannot be collected, then many litigants will not 
go to the trouble of suing in the first place. The power of the ILWU depended 
not just on the solidarity of its members, but on the contracts that the union 
negotiated, and the staff and monetary resources the union could bring to bear 
in negotiating and enforcing labor contracts. Bankrupting the union would 
jeopardize that power. 
There is a romantic quality to the vision of social movements as inchoate 
groups of mobilized people, rather than institutions; that vision suggests 
ideological purity and intrepidness. Yet, while institutionalization has at times 
been labor’s Achilles’ heel, it has also been a source of power. As Nelson 
Lichtenstein has theorized, the energy and commitment of non-institutionalized 
movements tends to fade away.437 Unions have endured because “[m]ember 
dues pay for a staff whose task it is to continually mobilize the membership, 
recruit new ones, and confront employer and state opponents.”438  
Juneau Spruce reveals that the strength of an institutionalized social 
movement becomes a vulnerability in a hostile legal climate. Bringing labor 
back into the law and social movements conversation complicates existing 
theories about how all movements navigate the trade-offs of institutionalization. 
3. Social Movement Lawyers in Service of Institutional Clients 
Law and social movements scholarship often portrays lawyers as advocates 
fighting for legal change.439 As a result, much of the literature focuses on 
movements led by lawyers.440 Labor aspired to be a movement led by workers, 
not lawyers. And yet, lawyers have also shaped the trajectory of labor, albeit for 
different reasons than most other social movements.441 Lawyers are not only part 
 
 437 Nelson Lichtenstein, Twenty-First Century “Populism:” Not for the Unions and a Good Thing Too, 14 
FORUM 235, 245 (2016). 
 438 Id. 
 439 See supra Part I. 
 440 There is a robust literature about what lawyers do to and for progressive social movements generally, 
and for the civil rights movement in particular. See, e.g., SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL 
ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880–1915 (2013); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: 
ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011). 
 441 WEINRIB, supra note 263; SCHILLER, supra note 47; SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: 
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); FRYMER, supra note 46.  
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of the mechanism by which mobilization or movements change law,442 but also 
how law changes movements. 
Labor lawyers played the same role as other social movement lawyers when 
they were advocates in litigation and legislative campaigns to establish new 
workplace rights. Many unions provided crucial financial support for Southern 
civil rights activism in the 1960s,443 fought hard for the enactment and 
enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,444 litigated and 
lobbied for legislation prohibiting employment discrimination,445 sought 
enactment of state agricultural and public sector labor relations acts, and fought 
for periodic increases to the minimum wage written into the FLSA446—and to 
win new rights in litigation (especially pay equity).  
But alongside those affirmative campaigns for law, there was the constant 
threat of legal liability under the Taft-Hartley Act. The professional culture of 
union lawyers involves a great deal of work for movement activists on the 
defense, especially after the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited picketing and other 
tactics to promote solidarity, and created a federal claim for damages.447 The 
fact that labor unions were large institutions—with millions of members, 
thousands of contracts to negotiate and enforce, and a welter of contractual and 
statutory responsibilities to workers and employers—fundamentally shaped the 
role of the union lawyer. The institutional aspect of labor unions gave lawyers 
 
 442 Compare MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004), and TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS (1988) (documenting 
the role of civil rights lawyers in eliminating legally mandated segregation), with SOUTHWORTH, supra note 158; 
Ann Southworth, Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court, 43 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 319 (2018) (documenting the role of a network of lawyers in achieving various legal changes 
sought by business, the Christian right, and various conservative groups). 
 443 The United Auto Workers (UAW) is well-known for its financial and political support of the civil rights 
movement. Less well-known is that its general counsel, Joseph Rauh, arranged for the loan of UAW money to 
bail out civil rights protesters in the early 1960s, and had the unenviable task of trying to collect the money from 
activists whose charges were dismissed so it could be returned to the union treasury. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, 
CITIZEN RAUH: AN AMERICAN LIBERAL’S LIFE IN LAW AND POLITICS (2011); Papers of Joseph L. Rauh Papers 
(1999) (on file with the Library of Congress, Joseph L. Rauh Papers, Box 97). 
 444 Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. 
 445 The UAW was a major advocate for enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., PARRISH, 
supra note 443, at 159–74 (describing the efforts of Joseph Rauh, lawyer for the UAW, in pushing for civil rights 
legislation in the early 1960s). The AFL-CIO filed party or amicus briefs in all the major employment 
discrimination cases since the 1970s, and its lawyers were involved in drafting the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (PDA). See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, Hearings Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Labor of the 
Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 199–205 (1977) (statement of Laurence Gold, Special Counsel, AFL-CIO); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT 
Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 362 n.151 (2017) (describing Marsha Berzon as “the PDA drafter”). 
 446 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060. 
 447 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197. 
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an institutional role: advising a client about compliance with complex 
contractual responsibilities and, importantly, protecting the institutional coffers 
from legal attacks. The Juneau Spruce struggle drove home to labor lawyers 
how high the stakes were for lawyers advising union clients. 
For labor unions, with the brief exception of the 1930s, law has been 
something to avoid as often as something to pursue. Moreover, as Part II shows, 
the Taft-Hartley Act consolidated the institutional nature of unions and 
leveraged it to restrict what business considered unbridled, destructive 
movement activism. Labor lawyers since 1947 have occupied a difficult position 
in navigating between law that allows little room for direct action and clients 
who believe that direct action is the only way to build worker power. Explaining 
the effect of law on the labor movement, Lee Pressman, the General Counsel of 
the CIO from 1936 to 1948, sarcastically described a “gimmick” of the Taft-
Hartley Act that had received “little notice yet has had a terrific impact on 
unions.”448 This was a provision partially repealing the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s 
protection against holding unions liable for the acts of organizers. Noting that 
since 1947 there had “been many occasions in which unions have been held 
liable for the acts of individual members on the picket line,” Pressman said that 
allowing such suits was “one of the most deadly provisions of the Taft-Hartley 
Act.”449 The Juneau Spruce struggle shows why. In today’s terms, union lawyers 
after 1947 had an important and unwelcome compliance role that was more 
similar to that of corporate lawyers than movement lawyers today.  
Labor lawyers feared the restrictions and the damages liabilities, but also 
worried that the law would make unions overly reliant on lawyers. Mathew 
Tobriner, a California labor lawyer who later became a respected California 
Supreme Court justice, predicted that “[t]he true beneficiaries [of the Taft-
Hartley Act] will be the lawyers, who will reap a fine harvest from this paradise 
of litigation.”450 Not only would member dues have to be diverted to pay legal 
fees rather than to support organizing, but lawyers would become essential to 
the labor movement’s strategic thinking. 
The questions for unions were no longer just about when and how to strike, 
boycott, or picket to build worker power, and how to avoid local police and state 
tort liability when engaging in movement activism. Rather, the questions 
became: Will a court find a strike illegal? What damages liability do we face if 
 
 448 THE REMINISCENCES OF LEE PRESSMAN: ORAL HISTORY 286–87 (1958). 
 449 Id. 
 450 New Law Is Called Lawyer’s Paradise, CONTRA COSTA CNTY. LAB. J. (1947) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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a court decides it’s illegal? The world that labor unions occupied became, 
suddenly, much more “law-thick,” which made it more important than before to 
get legal advice before acting.451 And lawyers for unions had more reasons to 
advise against numerous tactics.  
Having to say no—as when the International wired Local 16 raising doubts 
about the legality of the picketing to protest Juneau Spruce’s abrogation of the 
contract—ran against the grain for lawyers like Gladstein, Andersen, and 
Leonard, who became labor lawyers because they wanted to fight for working 
people.452 Although their courtroom work in Juneau Spruce was relatively 
conventional, Gladstein’s courtroom work in a Smith Act case during the same 
years was so rebellious,453 so radical,454 that it landed him in prison for six 
months for contempt of court.455 These were not lawyers who believed that they 
must be independent of or dominate their clients, or who were captivated by the 
“myth of rights,” as critics of lawyer-led social movements sometimes lament. 
Nor were they the type of labor lawyer who transformed radical and visionary 
worker demands into prosaic and modest claims that fit within existing law.456 
Rather, these were lawyers who were devoted to the cause, deeply connected to 
it, and committed to allowing the client’s priorities and values guide the 
representation, and who wanted to defer to client goals and strategic choices.457  
 
 451 Gillian K. Hadfield & Jamie Heine, Life in a Law-Thick World: The Legal Resource Landscape for 
Ordinary Americans, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 21 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy 
Radice eds., 2016). 
 452 Cf. Bell, Jr., supra note 159, at 490. 
 453 See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW 
PRACTICE (1992). 
 454 See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and 
the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982); Victor Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition 
in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 310–18 (David Kairys ed., 1990). 
 455 BELKNAP, supra note 309, at 112. 
 456 James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942–43, 1012–22 (1997) 
(recounting how, while workers asserted that the right to strike was protected by the Thirteenth Amendment, 
their lawyers undermined the movement’s “constitutional insurgency” by presenting the workers’ demands as a 
less radical First Amendment free speech right rather than the radical anti-slavery right the workers sought). 
 457 Compare Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the 
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 45 (1990) (describing lawyers who do not adhere to client priorities), 
with Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991) (describing lawyers who recount client narratives), Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client 
Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1101, 1120–22 (1996), and Ann Southworth, Business Planning for the Destitute? Lawyers as 
Facilitators in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1121, 1142 (1996). These lawyers were 
thus more like those that McCann and Silverstein described in their work on the pay equity campaign. See 
McCann & Silverstein, supra note 153. 
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The Juneau Spruce episode complicates existing notions of what it means to 
be a cause lawyer because it highlights the fact that repressive law, not just 
lawyers’ legal training or lack of imagination, can make lawyers the conduit that 
channels activism. The lawyers’ new and unwelcome role of having to be cops 
as well as counsel458 is also a function of the movement’s institutional power 
and obligations. 
4. Losing Through Losing 
Scholars of law and social movements have theorized a number of 
counterintuitive ways in which winning in litigation can produce a social 
movement loss459 and losing can produce a social movement win.460 Among the 
most enduring arguments in support of the “winning through losing” thesis is 
that a litigation loss can help social movement mobilization “by inspiring 
outrage and signaling the need for continued activism in light of courts’ failure 
to act” and by inducing movements “to appeal to the public by encouraging 
citizens to rein in an ‘activist,’ countermajoritarian judiciary.”461 Here, the 
constitutive effects of law are seen to outweigh its material effects; a formal legal 
outcome matters less than how it can be used to spur mobilization. 
To some extent, the Juneau Spruce saga exemplifies labor’s attempt to 
transform a legal loss into a movement win. Labor responded to the devastating 
judgment and the Supreme Court’s cavalier opinion upholding it by using the 
case as a call to arms for the repeal of Taft-Hartley.462 In Hawai’i, the ILWU 
portrayed the debt collection efforts as an assault on the union, which tens of 
thousands of Hawai’ian workers had struggled for decades to establish.463 Later, 
they celebrated their success in outwitting both Juneau Spruce and the Big Five 
by using money from the latter to pay off the former.464 The union’s leaders 
emphasized that through solidarity, they could overcome any attack.  
But the notion that litigation loss often produces positive movement effects 
is more compelling for social movement organizations that are on the offensive, 
seeking to establish new rights—as in NeJaime’s examples of LGBTQ activists 
 
 458 See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 118, at 462. 
 459 Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 
33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 869 (1999). 
 460 NeJaime, supra note 173, at 969. 
 461 Id.  
 462 See supra text accompanying notes 7–12, 286. 
 463 See supra Part II.C. 
 464 See supra text accompanying note 358. 
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and the Christian Right.465 By mid-century, however, the labor movement was 
not focused on winning through litigation, or even through legislation. After the 
Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act in 1937466 and Congress legislated 
minimum labor standards in 1938 that set the floor for collective bargaining,467 
labor had won all the victories from the state that it would get for decades. The 
Juneau Spruce mess was a reminder of what unions had discovered in fending 
off injunctions and damages suits since the nineteenth century—litigation was 
largely to be avoided, because courts were not a forum in which labor could 
expect to gain power, or even any rights that courts and employers would 
respect. And any losses they endured always had the potential to put at risk all 
that labor had won thus far. 
A litigation loss as momentous as the damages judgment in Juneau Spruce 
had material consequences that could not be “spun” away. Had the union’s 
lawyers not proven so strategic, the loss could have been the end of the union. 
But even though the union survived to fight another day, the case required union 
leaders and lawyers to expend resources devising clever ways to evade paying 
the judgment. Those resources—once again, every penny of which was from 
member dues—could have been spent fighting for better working conditions or 
organizing more workers. In the long term, the precedent it set taught union 
leadership to be much more careful of how they allowed International staff to 
support activism by locals, what they allowed to be said in the union newspaper, 
whether they would picket to protest employer abrogation of contracts, and 
whether or when the union would engage in secondary boycott activity in 
support of other workers.  
This is not to say that the ILWU became quiescent and never engaged in 
secondary boycotts or picketing; it still did, and it still does.468 And union 
lawyers with whom we have recently discussed this case insist that they do not 
tell the leadership or members not to be activists, but instead counsel them how 
to be activists in lawful ways. But none denies that the law has made it much 
harder for labor to engage in movement activism. It was the legacy of Juneau 
Spruce (if not the specific case) that prompted AFL-CIO President Lane 
 
 465 NeJaime, supra note 173. 
 466 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947). 
 467 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060. 
 468 ILWU Stands Down at West Coast Ports for Historic Juneteenth Action to Honor Black Lives, ILWU 
(July 13, 2020 12:18 PM), https://www.ilwu.org/ilwu-stands-down-at-west-coast-ports-for-historic-juneteenth-
action-to-honor-black-lives/. 
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Kirkland to lament in 1989 that labor would be better off if the entire NLRA, as 
amended, were repealed and labor went back to the “law of the jungle.”469  
Because of advances in law and social movements theory over the past 
several decades, it is no longer possible to deny the law’s powerful constitutive 
effects. As scholars continue the project of bringing more movements under 
study, we will see when the constitutive effects outweigh the instrumental effects 
of law, and when they do not. Bringing labor back into the conversation suggests 
caution in de-emphasizing the materiality of law. Whether it is the ILWU’s 
struggles against Juneau Spruce, low-wage workers fired for organizing against 
the threat of COVID-19,470 or immigrants arrested by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement for protesting their mistreatment,471 there are limits to the ability 
of even the most robust belief in legal rights to resist the power of state-
sanctioned repression backed by the force of law. 
5. Differentiated Rights 
Within law and social movements scholarship, debates about the value of 
rights talk have, at times, been divorced from both doctrine and legal discourse. 
The Juneau Spruce case—and the case of labor more generally—reemphasizes 
that not all social harms are equally cognizable as rights, whether in courts of 
law or public opinion. 
Labor’s experience with law has often been one of courts prioritizing 
employer property rights. Like many cases, Juneau Spruce involved competing 
rights claims.472 The Local sought to exercise rights to association and 
expression: to protest their employer’s abrogation of their labor contract and 
violation of its statutory obligations to bargain in good faith, and to encourage 
others to take action in concert with them.473 Juneau Spruce, on the other hand, 
sought to exercise a right to use its property to further its business interests 
without interference.474 In resolving these competing claims, the courts read the 
 
 469 Martin Tolchin, A.F.L.-C.I.O. Chief Laments State of Labor Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1989), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/30/us/afl-cio-chief-laments-state-of-labor-laws.html.  
 470 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Rachel Abrams, Fired in a Pandemic ‘Because We Tried to Start a Union,’ 
Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/business/coronavirus-unions-
layoffs.html. 
 471 Marissa J. Lang, Immigration Judge Revokes Green Card, Orders Deportation of Virginia Activist 
Alejandra Pablos, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/federal-
judge-revokes-green-card-orders-deportation-of-virginia-activist-alejandra-pablos/2018/12/12/fac5f3ea-fe40-
11e8-862a-b6a6f3ce8199_story.html. 
 472 Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952). 
 473 Id. at 238. 
 474 Id. at 238–39. 
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Taft-Hartley Act to prioritize business rights to uninterrupted operation over 
labor associational and expression rights.475 The Court held the union liable for 
actions that, if done today by any group other than a labor union, would be 
protected by the First Amendment.476 For the act of walking with signs outside 
of a lumber mill—using nothing but their physical presence and the written and 
spoken word—the union was held liable for damages in an amount to force it 
out of existence. 
This is not only about distinct types of rights, but also about whose claim to 
a certain type of right is more convincing. Over the multi-year legal battle to 
enforce the judgment, courts consistently prioritized Juneau Spruce’s claims 
over competing claims from ILWU-affiliated unions. Across jurisdictions, a 
variety of courts were willing to reach into the bank accounts of entities that 
were legally independent from the defendants actually found liable in the case, 
in order to ensure that Juneau Spruce’s judgment was satisfied. 
Bringing labor back into law and social movements studies helps complicate 
existing theories about the limits or promise of rights, including rights talk, as 
an undifferentiated category. As we know, certain grievances are more easily 
translated into rights language than others. Claims to social and economic rights 
largely lack the resonance of other rights claims, including the equality claims 
which have been central to more recent rights-based movements. As Sandra 
Levitsky has shown, given the minimal U.S. welfare state, many people continue 
to understand rights as “limited only to certain kinds of civil and political 
rights.”477 Without a “widely available discourse” of socio-economic rights, 
those who struggle without government support for their daily socio-economic 
needs often “fundamentally [do] not understand how to apply the concept of 
rights to their circumstances.”478 
Labor has often eschewed rights invocations because labor’s goals do not fit 
neatly into existing discourse or constitutional doctrine.479 As Kate Andrias 
 
 475 Id. at 244–45. 
 476 See Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 2057 (2018). 
 477 Sandra Levitsky, “What Rights?” The Construction of Political Claims to American Health Care 
Entitlements, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551, 576 (2008). 
 478 Id. at 566, 576. 
 479 Andrias sees labor’s demands as being “more incompatible with court adjudication than the individual 
rights claims of recent identity-based movements, or even than revived efforts to win constitutional rights for 
the indigent.” Andrias, supra note 196, at 1614. She attributes the incompatibility to the fact that the goal of 
labor law and the labor movement “is not only to guarantee individual rights or to secure freedom for workers 
from abuses of employer power, but also to enable workers to participate in the formation of conditions that 
structure their lives.” Id. 
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points out, while “there is a developed line of constitutional law doctrine that 
tackles problems of discrimination, at least in the public sector,” a credible 
theory of constitutional support for “minimum entitlements and collective labor 
rights” remains weak.480 There are currently no constitutional rights to minimum 
labor standards, to co-determine conditions of work, or to use direct action, 
including strikes, to secure minimum standards. Indeed, says Andrias, “court-
defined rights, as they exist in the modern American tradition, are in substantial 
tension with the commitments and goals of the labor movement.”481  
This disparity among movements in the work that rights do is evident in 
classic works on social movements. McCann’s pathbreaking defense of rights 
was based on his empirical finding that union litigation challenging the gendered 
pay gap in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to movement-building and 
consciousness-raising, even when the litigation failed.482 Now, twenty-five years 
after the publication of the book, however, it is clear that this momentum 
translated into long-term gains solely on the issue of pay equity. In the early 
1980s, women made approximately 62% of what men made; in 2018, they made 
85% of what men made.483 But this consciousness-raising did not build the labor 
movement. In the early 1980s, 20% of the United States workforce were union 
members.484 Today, in sharp contrast to the progress achieved on pay equity, 
union density has been halved.485 As Nelson Lichtenstein has observed, 
“American unions have been unable to make the rights revolution work for 
them. . . . [F]or most of U.S. labor, especially that centered in the private sector, 
rights consciousness, which has revolutionized race and gender relations, has 
had little organizational payoff.”486 
By arguing that certain rights claims have greater discursive legitimacy than 
others, we do not mean to disagree with scholars who have argued that the 
United States Constitution can be interpreted to have much more to say about 
material inequality and distributive justice than is commonly presumed.487 The 
past decade has seen a blossoming of scholarship that reconstructs paths not 
 
 480 Id. at 1597 n.34. 
 481 Id. at 1598, 1612. 
 482 MCCANN, supra note 25, at 278–84. 
 483 See, e.g., Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, But Persistent, Gender Gap in 
Pay, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/03/22/gender-pay-gap-
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 484 MAYER, supra note 39, at 22. 
 485 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2019, at 1 (Jan. 
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 486 NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, A CONTEST OF IDEAS: CAPITAL, POLITICS, AND LABOR 151 (2013). 
 487 See, e.g., Lynd, supra note 89, at 1440. 
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taken in defining the scope of U.S. constitutional concerns.488 Courts in the 
1940s understood collective labor rights to association and protest to be a central 
First Amendment concern.489 Civil rights attorneys argued that the Thirteenth 
Amendment imposed affirmative duties on the government to address economic 
exploitation as well as racial discrimination.490 The story of how these 
distributive concerns were ultimately read out of constitutional canon following 
World War II is a long and complex one, but the point these scholars make is 
that other readings of the Constitution are possible.491 
Still, the foundational work of building a discourse of constitutionally 
protected social and economic rights is, at best, a work in progress. Whatever 
progressive legal scholars and labor unions may imagine for the future of the 
First Amendment, a majority of the Supreme Court—for now—contends that 
only public sector labor law—not the Bill of Rights—gives employees the right 
to collectively bargain, and that right is more vulnerable than ever. The work of 
building a constitutional theory that would, for instance, regulate “private” 
economic coercion or guarantee a living wage is, as yet, even more embryonic. 
Within this context, and consistent with the experience of the ILWU in Juneau 
Spruce, it is clear that rights are not an undifferentiated category.  
B. Toward a Theory of the Changing Role of Law and Lawyers Through 
Cycles of Protest 
As we noted at the outset, our goal in this Article is to ask the question—
what do we get when we bring labor back into the fold of law and social 
movement scholarship? Refocusing on labor complicates existing conversations 
in the field. But we think it may do something more. By emphasizing the 
differences over time in how movements have experienced law—by suggesting 
that the relationship between law and movements is socio-historically specific—
it invites greater attention to how and why movements’ relationship with law 
shifts over time.  
 
 488 See, e.g., Joseph R. Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An 
Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2016); 
GOLUBOFF, supra note 110; LEE, supra note 441. 
 489 Fisk, supra note 476, at 2067. 
 490 See Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (2012). 
 491 See generally Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 488 (describing the process by which affirmative rights 
to economic and political equality were read out of the constitution and proposing how they might be read back 
in). On how distributive concerns lost traction in the civil rights movement’s litigation agenda, see GOLUBOFF, 
supra note 110, at 141–73. 
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We turn in this section to a tentative theoretical outline of what a socio-
historical approach to the study of law and social movements might look like.492 
And we conclude with thoughts about how this kind of approach might 
illuminate the relationship between the labor movement and the rights-based 
movements which succeeded it. 
Much law and social movements scholarship has focused on only one 
movement at a time. Doing so is important; it enables a deep look that would not 
be possible with a comparative or broadly contextualized study. Yet, it is also 
important to consider the mutually constitutive relationships between law and 
movements. By examining the ways in which one movement’s experience with 
law shapes other movements’ experience with law over time we are better able 
to generalize about law and social movements, plural. 
Two key principles would animate a socio-historical approach to the study 
of law and social movements. First, it would emphasize the relationship between 
movements in and over time. As political scientist Sidney Tarrow has argued, 
movements tend to arise within “cycles of protest.”493 These are periods—the 
present moment appears to be one—of massive social upheaval. Because of a 
particular confluence of events, one movement rises up and succeeds. Its success 
signals “the vulnerability of the state to collective action,” and ushers in 
conditions under which other movements rise up as well.494 Situating 
movements in these cycles reminds us that “[t]he most fundamental fact about 
collective action is its connectedness, both historically and spatially, both with 
other instances of collective action of a similar kind, and with the actions of 
different claim-makers such as authorities and countermovements.”495 
 
 492 This approach builds upon Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s work in theorizing “repertoires of 
contention” and “cycles of protest,” respectively. Charles Tilly, Repertoires of Contention in America and 
Britain, 1750–1830, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 
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political, historical, and cultural context. A repertoire is “what [movements] know how to do and what society 
has come to expect them to choose to do from within a culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of 
options.” Sidney Tarrow, Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of 
Contention, 17 SOC. SCI. HIST. 281, 283 (1993). And, as set forth below, the concept of “cycles of protest” 
emphasizes periodicity and the relationships among movements in accounting for how repertoires emerge, 
diffuse, and evolve. 
 493 TARROW, supra note 59; see also McCann, supra note 24, at 26 (referring to “the common scholarly 
premise that movement formation and action are more likely in periods when dominant groups and state-
authorized relationships are perceived as vulnerable to challenge”). 
 494 Sidney Tarrow, States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, 
AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996). 
 495 Ruud Koopmans, Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 19 (David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi eds., 
FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:01 PM 
2020] PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW 139 
Because of this connectedness, one movement may empower others, but it 
may constrain or weaken them as well. How early movements within a protest 
cycle frame their grievances can become a “master frame,” an almost hegemonic 
way of representing movement claims.496 This frame serves as “a kind of master 
algorithm” which “colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other 
movements.”497 Similarly, the organizational forms and strategies of early 
movements in a cycle often become the models for later movements. Thus, the 
tactical repertoire of early movements also tends to “color and constrain” the 
toolkits of later movements.498 
Second, a socio-historical approach to law and social movements would 
emphasize the dialectical relationship between social movements and law. The 
ways in which social movements engage with law are shaped by the legal 
possibilities available to them, and these legal possibilities are in turn shaped by 
social movement action. As Ellen Ann Andersen puts it in her examination of 
the role of “legal opportunity structures” in gay rights litigation in the United 
States, “socio-legal structures shape movement strategies and are shaped by 
those strategies in turn.”499 Like the common law, one movement’s legal 
outcome is reincorporated into the legal regime in which other movements 
navigate. As Serena Mayeri has shown, law particularly encourages analogical 
reasoning about unfair treatment, as each new group seizes upon legal precedent 
and seeks to apply that precedent to its own case.500 Either a success or a loss 
fundamentally reshapes the tactical choices available to all movements. 
Taken together, these two principles mean that when movements engage 
with the legal system, they are, in part, engaging with the legacies of previous 
movement actors. The “rights” available to movements are, as Bartholomew and 
Hunt put it, “the crystallization of past struggles and the resulting balances of 
forces or power, which are thereby legitimated.”501 Born of a particular socio-
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historical juncture and its particular compromises, such rights “play a role in 
constituting the terrain for subsequent social action and interaction.”502 
C. The Legal Reification of Movements 
The socio-historic approach to law and social movements that we have 
sketched above begins to bridge the conceptual gap between labor and the more 
recent rights-based social movements, to see how law has played a role, among 
other factors, in constructing them as separate and apart from each other. In so 
doing, this approach allows for a more systematic analysis of how law shaped 
social movement activity, and social movement activity shaped law, throughout 
the twentieth century.  
With its remarkable victory in Brown v. Board of Education, the civil rights 
movement launched a new cycle of protest, which lasted well into the 1970s, 
and whose legacy continues to shape movements today.503 As the progenitor of 
the cycle, the civil rights movement empowered and constrained other 
movements. The women’s, disability, and LGBTQ rights movements—along 
with others—are commonly seen as drawing from the civil rights master frame 
and from its socio-legal tactical toolkit.504 They sought to accomplish social 
change through claims-making on behalf of minority groups.505 Their charge 
was at times led by legal advocacy organizations with lawyers at the helm. And 
they invoked rights language which accomplished significant constitutive 
change, even if material change was not always forthcoming.506 In other words, 
they were empowered and constrained by the same model of social movement 
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that has at times dominated the socio-legal imaginary and law and social 
movements scholarship. 
The distinctive characteristics of the civil rights movement and its approach 
to law were not constructed in a vacuum, however. They evolved over more than 
a century of struggle on multiple fronts. When W.E.B. DuBois wrote his classic 
1935 book on Reconstruction, in the midst of the great labor upheavals of the 
1930s, he deliberately characterized the activism of enslaved people in bringing 
about the end of slavery as a “general strike” that targeted slavery as an 
economic institution.507 Similarly, later historians of Reconstruction have 
theorized Black people as workers engaged in struggle with employers.508 
According to historian Paul Lawrie, the so-called “Labor” and “Negro” 
problems of the late 1800s and early 1900s were actually deeply interconnected, 
linked by the “sociocultural demands of contemporary labor economy.”509  
DuBois and others have rightly emphasized the role of racism by white 
workers and their unions in the divergence of labor and civil rights after the Civil 
War.510 Law, however, helped reify this divergence, increasingly channeling 
these interconnected issues into discrete regulatory regimes. One of the biggest 
limitations of the NLRA, as enacted, was its racialized and gendered 
exclusions.511 Through the purposeful exclusion of agricultural, domestic, and 
public sector workers, the demographics of the workers for whom unionization 
was legally accessible remained for decades, by law, whiter and more male than 
the entire working class.512 Moreover, through the legal requirement that unions 
be supported by a majority of workers in a bargaining unit, the law created 
further opportunities for employers to forestall unionization by appealing to 
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racial divisions, and for white workers to prevent Black workers from centering 
issues of discrimination in the workplace through labor unions.513 
The Taft-Hartley Act went one step further, limiting the scope of legitimate 
union activity, as opportunities for solidaristic struggle between labor unions and 
civil rights groups seemed increasingly possible. First, by the early 1950s, the 
Taft-Hartley Act’s anti-Communist requirement had forced labor unions to 
purge their leadership of activists most committed to racial justice.514 Second, 
Taft-Hartley and a number of restrictive court and agency decisions prohibited 
the kinds of direct action (especially sit-down strikes and secondary protests) 
which had created the New Deal.515 Juneau Spruce drove home that running 
afoul of these prohibitions meant risking everything labor had already won. 
Third, after the Supreme Court ruled in 1950 that civil rights picketing urging a 
consumer boycott of a grocery store that refused to hire Black clerks could be 
enjoined because it, like labor picketing, was economic coercion not 
constitutionally protected political speech,516 civil rights activists had good 
reason to frame their protests as seeking political and social transformation—
voting, education, access to places of public accommodation—rather than as a 
strike over working conditions. If a labor union had been prominently involved, 
sector-wide picketing or boycotts would have been subject to injunctions and, 
as in Juneau Spruce, crushing damages liability. If a union was not at the 
forefront, social movement actors could and did successfully argue that their 
protest was “political” and protected by the First Amendment. For all these 
reasons, when the civil rights movement entered its direct action phase with the 
lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, their lawyers’ best hope for securing legal 
protection was to distance the movement’s activism from the labor picketing and 
sit-downs that came before, and to emphasize the political and social aspects of 
the protests, rather than the economic.517 
The extraordinary repression faced by majoritarian, multiracial, radical labor 
unions between 1947 and 1955 had long-term impact for both the labor and the 
civil rights movements.518 By furthering the divide between labor and civil 
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rights, law weakened both. According to Robert Korstad and Nelson 
Lichtenstein, the repression of union workers’ civil rights activism in the 1940s 
resulted in the civil rights struggle of the 1960s having a different social 
character and a different political agenda than it might otherwise have had.519 
The crushing of the incipient efforts of unions to organize—in the South, in 
agriculture, in nonwhite communities—left unions weaker.520 The repression of 
radical intersectional unionism empowered those factions in the labor movement 
who were not committed to racial equality and left the civil rights and women’s 
movements cut off from the workplace as a way to build an inclusive structure 
of economic equity.  
While bearing in mind labor’s affirmative  contribution to this divide,521 it is 
worth considering what the labor and civil rights movements might have been 
like had the Taft-Hartley Act not derailed Operation Dixie, the CIO Southern 
organizing effort of 1946 to 1953.522 Unions recognized from the moment they 
began unionizing industry in the North and Midwest that the gains workers made 
would hasten business efforts to find lower-wage and more exploitable labor in 
the South.523 Therefore, as soon as World War II ended, the CIO launched 
Operation Dixie, a massive effort to organize textile and other industries in the 
South on a racially inclusive, industrial basis.524 Communist unionists’ staunch 
anti-racism and determination to organize the South provided even more reasons 
for business leaders to use the Taft-Hartley Act’s anti-Communist oath provision 
to drive them out of the unions.525 Had more people of color succeeded in their 
quest to form and join labor unions at this time, the divide between “labor” and 
“civil rights” would not have been as large. That, in turn, might have reduced 
the ability of economic elites to perpetuate their centuries-long strategy of 
dividing the working class on the basis of race. It might have provided the 
institutional basis to create a federal labor agency that treated labor rights and 
employment discrimination rights together rather than separately, which 
scholars have shown weakened the NLRB, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
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Commission, and state fair employment practices agencies, and also weakened 
the worker protections that these agencies enforce.526 And it would have 
provided the civil rights movement with a strong institutional footing and a focus 
on workplace and economic equity. 
The history of the women’s movement between 1940 and 1980 similarly 
reveals that unions provided a fertile environment in which working-class 
women organized and developed a vision of feminism that focused on economic 
equity for working women, especially women of color and women who were the 
primary breadwinners for their family. This vision differed significantly from 
the middle class maternalistic or social issue-oriented liberationist visions of 
feminism which came to dominate the headlines.527 As Cobble shows, the labor 
movement of the 1940s “spurred feminism in much the same way as did the civil 
rights movement or the 1960s New Left organizations, albeit for a different 
group of women.”528 Again, the decline of the CIO unions that provided a base 
for Black, Latina, and working-class white women deprived the women’s 
movement of the 1980s and later of a strong foundation in the experiences of 
working women of color. 
Just as organized labor’s experience with law affected the form and 
trajectory of the civil rights movement and the feminist movement, the civil 
rights movement’s experience with law would alter the trajectory of labor too. 
When social movements inscribe their particularized, compromised, and socio-
historically specific vision of justice in the law, those changes become part of 
the governing order. When the limitations of that new order ultimately become 
apparent, they are subject to challenge by new movements, who will, to some 
extent, dismantle the work of previous challengers in inscribing their own vision.  
Organized labor, which arose in an earlier cycle of protest with distinct 
frames, organizational forms, tactics, and legal claims, did not fare as well in the 
cycle of protest initiated by the civil rights movement. As noted above, cycles 
of protest are not simply generative; they are destructive.529 The demise of 
movements “can also be explained in part by the emergence of frames that 
challenge or compete with the movement’s master frame.”530 Organized labor’s 
defining frame has always been solidarity, and its primary tactic has been to 
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build power through private, worker-run institutions. The rights-based 
movements of the latter half of the twentieth century directly called into question 
the concept of labor solidarity, highlighting the exclusions on which it had been 
built. And their emphasis on building public law as a mechanism of social justice 
similarly tended to delegitimize the privatized welfare state that had been labor’s 
infrastructure.  
The Supreme Court issued its Juneau Spruce decision in 1952, just two years 
before Brown.531 Decided as one cycle of protest waxed and another waned, the 
case reflects both how the law came to channel labor activism into particularly 
narrow pathways, and to treat it differently than other social movements. 
To the first point, Juneau Spruce is a concrete example of how the Taft-
Hartley Act weakened labor as a broad, class-based movement. Taft-Hartley has 
long been understood by scholars as having been intended to drive apart groups 
within the dominant social movements of the mid-century.532 The anti-
Communist oath provision was to push Communists out of the labor movement, 
inserting a wedge between radicals and liberals.533 That, in turn, would weaken 
the connections between labor and civil rights activists, weaken labor’s drive 
into the South, and slow the drive for racial equality that Communists and 
radicals were deeply committed to advancing.534 As applied in Juneau Spruce, 
the restrictions on direct action weakened industrial unionism and sectoral 
bargaining by allowing the employer to ignore the CIO’s own resolution of the 
dispute between the ILWU and the IWA.535 This contributed to splintering labor 
as a movement into groups divided by skill, trade, race, gender, region, and 
occupation. 
The ILWU was one of the few unions that succeeded in organizing, and in 
making its organizing gains stick (at least for a time), across the boundaries of 
race, occupation, and even sectorperhaps more even than the industrial unions 
in auto, steel, mining, and meatpacking, which were the bulwarks of the CIO.536 
That the company’s lawyers chose to attack Hawai’i Local 142 in its judgment 
collection efforts (more, as far as the historical record reveals, than any other 
local except Local 16, which had picketed) is not merely because it was huge 
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and therefore had more dues-paying members to provide funds to pay the 
judgment.537 Its multiracial, sectoral, multi-occupational, and state-wide 
membership was a radical departure from the norm for unions of the era and was 
a threat to the political and economic power of the white elites in Hawai’i.538 
When the litigation established the principles that solidarity across a union could 
be punished by damages, that the CIO’s resolution of the jurisdictional dispute 
was not binding on anyone (including one of the unions that participated in the 
dispute resolution process), and that one union could be forced to pay damages 
for picketing done by another, the law created very strong incentives for unions 
to eschew the kind of cross-sectoral activism which was the goal of the ILWU 
in the 1940s. 
The business elite’s divide and conquer strategy was achieved by bans on 
picketing, especially for purposes of organization, recognition, or jurisdictional 
protest, and by bans on secondary appeals to workers and consumers.539 These 
legal prohibitions were precisely tailored to weaken labor as a force for solidarity 
across occupations, workplaces, and between consumers and workers.540 The 
introduction of courts into the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, 
the provisions allowing unions to be sued in federal court, and the NLRB’s 
authority over bargaining unit determinations and the provisions forbidding 
jurisdictional strikes were to force union leaders to be “responsible,” to pursue 
narrower goals of narrower segments of workers through bargaining rather than 
through direct action.541 Finally, the restrictions on union political 
expenditures—which were among the first campaign finance limitations in 
federal law, and preceded by decades any comparable restrictions on corporate 
expenditures—were intended to weaken unions as political actors and thereby 
blunt the effectiveness of national, class-based activism.542 
To the second point, Juneau Spruce was possible only because of the Court’s 
increasing reluctance to conceptualize labor as a social movement. When the 
Supreme Court rejected free speech challenges to Taft-Hartley Act’s restrictions 
on protest in the same years as the Juneau Spruce litigation, it emphasized union 
protests as being animated by the economic self-interest of workers.543 The 
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Court abandoned the view it had taken in Thornhill v. Alabama in 1940, when it 
accorded First Amendment protection to labor picketing because “[t]he health 
of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on” the ability 
of workers to protest, and “[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in 
industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the 
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the 
destiny of modern industrial society.”544 Rather, in Juneau Spruce and in cases 
decided around the same time, the Court characterized labor issues as economic, 
not political, and labor’s interests as being narrowly limited to the wealth of the 
picketers rather than the welfare of society at large.545 
But this happened just as the Montgomery Bus Boycott ignited the fuse of 
social movement activism that exploded during the direct-action phase of the 
civil rights movement.546 By the time the sit-in cases had reached the Court just 
a decade after Juneau Spruce, protests about equitable access to places of public 
accommodation and to jobs free from discrimination were characterized as 
political, and in pursuit of the public interest, rather than narrow self-interest.547 
Thus, the Court said, in according First Amendment protection to the Freedom 
Summer-era boycott of white-owned businesses in Mississippi, civil rights 
boycotts, unlike labor boycotts, “sought no special advantage for themselves.”548 
Juneau Spruce is thus one important and largely unknown chapter in the 
larger process by which workers, acting through unions, became ever more 
constrained in their ability to engage in the quintessential social movement 
activity of using protest to exert social and economic power. It was part of a 
series of cases in which the Supreme Court read federal law to broadly restrict 
union protests and rejected First Amendment claims for labor protest.549 And 
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that exclusion matters when the price of unprotected activism was as great as the 
ILWU found it in the 1950s, and as it is now. 
D. The Future of Labor as a Social Movement 
This Article has focused on the relationship between law and organized labor 
in one primary incarnation—labor unions regulated by law. By granting rights 
to this particular organizational form, unions qua collective bargaining agents 
became the dominant way through which workers could and would seek 
collective advancement for decades—even as the law changed to impose more 
costs and fewer benefits.  
As union density continues its decades-long decline and labor law becomes 
ever more incompatible with economic realities, the future of that form of 
organized labor is uncertain. Consistent with the dynamic interplay between law 
and movements, new forms of organized labor emerge in its wake: workers’ 
centers and other “alt-labor” organizations. We have focused less on these 
alternate models in this Article—partly because they are somewhat easier to 
conceive of as social movement actors, and have been named and analyzed as 
such in the legal literature.550 
And yet, it is precisely the “tangle of incentives” created by labor law that 
forces this distinction, between “social movement organization” on the one 
hand, and “labor union” on the other. Workers centers insist that they are not 
labor unions largely because doing so frees them from the specter of Juneau 
Spruce-like liability; federal injunctions under section 8(b)(4) and damages 
judgments under section 303 are available only against “labor unions,” not social 
justice organizations.551 Not being a labor union regulated by law allows 
workers, particularly those excluded from the NLRA, or for whom its rigid 
structure is particularly inapt, to advance their collective interests more 
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effectively. As other scholars have written, these organizations have helped re-
center economic equity and workplace exploitation as social justice issues—and 
class as an essential component of intersectionality. Their dynamic tactics, their 
focus on the most vulnerable workers, and their insurgency make their claim to 
social movement status stronger. But, for all their pathbreaking work, they also 
bump up against the limitations of their structure. Like their counterparts 100 
years ago, they are limited in their capacity to effect change without an ongoing 
institutional role in the workplace. Again, law gives shape to social movements, 
whether movements seek out the law or not. 
As we contemplate the future of the labor movement, the ways in which law 
has both protected and repressed workers through the regulation of labor unions 
merit careful consideration. For all the weaknesses of their increasingly narrow 
form, labor unions stand out, too, for their successes. As Jim Pope points out, 
workers’ centers are often not funded and controlled by the workers they serve: 
Alone among social movements, the labor movement has routinely 
managed to create durable, democratic mass organizations that can 
function both locally and nationally. The fact that unions have much 
to learn from other movements, like the civil rights and the women’s 
movements, should not blind us to the fact that those movements have 
rarely produced such organizations—except in the form of labor 
unions. This is no small matter.552  
Moreover, workers’ centers do not do what unions do: organize broad 
coalitions to exert collective power within workplaces.553 
Even as we have argued that the labor movement has more similarities to 
other social movements than has commonly been understood, it is important to 
remember the ways it is distinct. Labor as the basis of an oppositional movement 
represents a crucial liability of capitalism. Other movements coexist more easily 
within this country’s governing economic logic, at least to some extent, whereas 
the labor movement challenges the primacy of capital.554 Against all odds, labor 
unions radically transformed the American political economy for decades. Their 
decimation has increased economic stratification and weakened the center-left 
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political coalition.555 Whatever form the future of the labor movement takes, a 
massive task awaits it.  
CONCLUSION 
Our goal in this Article has been to expand the boundaries of what constitutes 
the study of law and social movements—to include labor unions seeking 
economic equity within the workplace, and their socio-historically specific 
relationship with law. 
To do so, we presented a case study of how the labor movement experienced 
the law during the mid-twentieth century, not as a goal, tactic, or framebut as 
something imposed upon it, despite labor’s best efforts to avoid it. The legal 
restraints of the Taft-Hartley Act, as interpreted by courts, seized upon much of 
what had been labor’s strengthsits institutional power (and its coffers), its use 
of picketing to create solidarity, its legitimacy as a movement advancing the 
general goodand regulated these strengths to the point of depriving them of 
potency. Juneau Spruce exploited dissension within the ranks of the CIO, a 
dissension that had been fanned into flames by the Taft-Hartley Act’s coercion 
of unions to oust suspected Communists from their ranks. The NLRB and courts 
aided that effort by ignoring the peaceful resolution of the dispute between the 
two contending unions at the Juneau Spruce mill. Having thus denied labor 
organizations the power to resolve the disputes, the courts then conceptualized 
the economic harm that ensued as being entirely the fault of the unions. These 
multifaceted legal constraints required union lawyers at every step of the process 
to counsel clients to moderate, to redirect, or to cease movement activity. At the 
same time, new social movements arose, which sought to avoid labor’s fate, and 
in so doing, reconstituted the relationship between social movements and law. 
The story of Juneau Spruce is important not just conceptually but 
temporally. The early 1950s was a transition point in cycles of protestthe point 
at which one vision of social movement replaced another, when one type of 
regulatory regime began to regress, just as another coalesced. Looking back at 
that moment in time, it is hard not to considerand perhaps mournpaths not 
taken, paths that might have better reconciled these two models of social 
movement. Today, we sit at what may be another historical turning point. The 
past ten years can be seen as their own cycle of protesta populist challenge to 
the neoliberal turn of the decades prior.556 New visions of justice contend with 
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older ones: international solidarity versus national supremacy; environment 
versus growth; inclusion versus exclusion. The raison d’être of 
governanceand of law with itappears to be in question. And so too does the 
future of the labor movement. 
On the heels of two years—2018 and 2019—that saw more workers on strike 
than in previous decades, the 2020 crisis of capitalism brought on by the global 
coronavirus pandemic has called long overdue attention to the dearth of worker 
protection and social insurance in the United States. Daily headlines question 
how it came to be that so many of the workers deemed “essential” are poorly 
paid, without health insurance and sick leave, and excluded from legal 
protections linked to employment, because they are undocumented or 
misclassified as independent contractors.557 We have shown that law played a 
significant role in bringing about a world in which essential workers have so few 
protections; it channeled labor from its mass movement origins in the 1930s, 
into a powerful institution from the 1940s through the 1960s, to its much 
weakened form today.  
Envisioning there to be different models for how social movements are 
organized and for how they engage with law not only helps us think through the 
socio-historical specificity of the rights-oriented social movements, but also 
allows for theorizing how other movements have drawn or could yet build upon 
organized labor’s collective action, majoritarian, non-rights-based model. For 
example, other groups (e.g., tenant unions, debtor unions, cooperatives, credit 
unions, or even class actions) have created or could create institutional channels 
for the ongoing exercise of collective power. In turn, those institutional channels 
will both empower and repress, just as they did for labor. And, of course, our 
socio-historical approach also invites creativity in thinking through new 
organizational forms and new ways of interacting with law. 
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In chaotic times like 2020, scholarship at the nexus of law and social 
movements is more important than ever. For that scholarship to be able to 
theorize these new challenges, it must be attentive to the jurisprudential 
boundaries which have channeled social movement activity throughout the 
twentieth century. 
 
